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INTRODUCTION
By most counts, bisexuals make up the largest sexual minority
group in the United States, and they have been litigating and advo-
cating for their right to be free of discrimination since the early days
of the gay rights movement.1 Yet they remain largely invisible in the
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1. For information on the number of bisexuals in the population compared to lesbians
and gays in the population, see S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N LGBT ADVISORY COMM.,
BISEXUAL INVISIBILITY: IMPACTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1–3 (2011) (describing bisexuals
as the largest sexual minority group in the United States based on data from several
studies); GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST. HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL,
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case law and in the popular understanding of discrimination.2 Why
is this? While more than one academic in the field suggested—in in-
formal discussion about this project—that lack of discrimination was
the reason for bisexuals’ invisibility in the case law, this supposition
is inconsistent with the emerging social science data on the ex-
periences of bisexuals.3 It also conflicts with the results of our study,
which is the first published quantitative study to focus comprehen-
sively on bisexuals’ experiences with employment discrimination. Our
study demonstrates that bisexuals face considerable discrimination
in the workplace.
A. Bisexual Invisibility Generally
Fifteen years ago, building on the work of other legal scholars
such as Naomi Mezey,4 Kenji Yoshino documented bisexual invisi-
bility and theorized that it was due to what he termed “an epistemic
contract of bisexual erasure.” 5 In other words, social norms that un-
consciously developed from heterosexuals’ and homosexuals’ shared
interest in eliding bisexuality.6 He posited that this erasure developed
AND TRANSGENDER? 1 (Apr. 2011) (describing bisexuals as comprising a slight majority
compared to those who identify as lesbian or gay); see also LISA M. DIAMOND, SEXUAL
FLUIDITY: UNDERSTANDING WOMEN’S LOVE AND DESIRE 27 (2008) (stating that “individuals
with bisexual attractions . . . [are now known to] outnumber individuals with exclusive
same-sex attractions . . . .”); Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure,
52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 380 (2000) (reporting that the studies examined reveal that “the inci-
dence of bisexuality [among each study’s respondents] was greater than or comparable to
the incidence of homosexuality”). For information demonstrating bisexuals’ involvement
in the early days of the gay rights movement, see Brett Beemyn, Bisexuality, Bisexuals,
and Bisexual Movements, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANS-
GENDERED HISTORY IN AMERICA 141, 141–42 (Marc Stein ed., 2004). For a relatively early
example of a bisexual plaintiff litigating a discrimination claim, see Rowland v. Mad
River Local Sch. Dist., Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984); see also
Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 133 (1967) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (quoting the psychiatry report in a case appealing exclusion of an alien for
homosexuality, which stated that “[h]is sexual structure still appears fluid and immature
so that he moves from homosexual to heterosexual interests as well as abstinence with
almost equal facility”).
2. JENNIFER BAUMGARDNER, LOOK BOTH WAYS: BISEXUAL POLITICS 192 (2007) (dis-
cussing the lack of case law and organizing around bisexual rights); MEG BARKER ET AL.,
THE BISEXUALITY REPORT: BISEXUAL INCLUSION IN LGBT EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY 4
(2012) (discussing the invisibility of bisexuality); Ruth Colker, Bi: Race, Sexual Orienta-
tion, Gender, and Disability, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 30 (1995) (“The term ‘bisexual’ is rarely
recognized by courts and legislatures.”); Yoshino, supra note 1, at 434–35 (stating that
“bisexuals are for the most part . . . invisible in the law . . . .”).
3. See, e.g., S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N LGBT ADVISORY COMM., supra note 1, at
12–13, 27.
4. Naomi Mezey, Dismantling the Wall: Bisexuality and the Possibilities of Sexual
Identity Classification Based on Acts, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 98 (1995). Ruth Colker
is another legal scholar who wrote pioneering work on bisexuality in the years before
Yoshino. Colker, supra note 2, at 30–41.
5. Yoshino, supra note 1, at 391–92.
6. Id. at 391–92.
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because of both groups’ shared interest in (1) “the stability of sexual
orientation categories”; (2) maintenance of “the primacy of sex as a dia-
critical characteristic”; and (3) “the preservation of monogamy,” all of
which are threatened by bisexuality.7 Yoshino described several dif-
ferent methods of bisexual erasure and noted that the erasure was re-
flected in both social science literature and in the law.8
Since Yoshino’s article was published in 2000, bisexual visibility
has increased to some degree, but bisexual invisibility remains a for-
midable problem.9 Some concrete indications that bisexual visibility
is increasing have occurred in the past couple of years. For instance,
for the first time ever, an openly bisexual Member of the House of Rep-
resentatives was elected in November 2012.10 House member Kyrsten
Sinema beat her Tea Party opponent by 10,000 votes in a nail-biting
race that was not called until several days after the election.11 She is
one of only a small handful of out bisexual elected officials in the na-
tion.12 As this Article was going to press, Kate Brown became the na-
tion’s first openly bisexual governor, taking office in Oregon after
John Kitzhaber resigned.13 Actresses and entertainers are also increas-
ingly coming out as bisexual, sometimes proudly, as in the case of
7. Id. at 399; see also Mezey, supra note 4, at 99, 103, 114–15 (describing homo-
sexuals’ and heterosexuals’ shared interest in eliding bisexuality); accord Gretchen Adel
Myers, Note, Allowing for Cultural Discussion of Queerness and Pansexuality: Sex/Gender
/Sexual Belief Systems, the Religion Clauses, and the Ideal of Pluralism, 38 STETSON L.
REV. 409, 421–22 (2009).
8. Yoshino, supra note 1, at 367-68, 395.
9. See, e.g., DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 27, 95 (documenting the comparatively low
percentage of scholarly literature on same-sex sexuality that mentions bisexuality in
the title, abstract, or subject headings); BARKER ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (discussing bi-
sexual invisibility); Michael Boucai, Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument
from Bisexuality, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415, 453–57 (2012) (discussing bisexual erasure
and invisibility); Nancy C. Marcus, Bridging Bisexual Erasure in LGBT-Rights Discourse
and Litigation, 22 MICH. J. OF GENDER & L. (forthcoming in 2015) (discussing continuing
problems of bisexual erasure in LGBT rights litigation and discourse) (unpublished manu-
script on file with author); Eliel Cruz, The Year in Bisexual Invisibility: It’s been a year
of some awful bisexual erasure, ADVOCATE.COM (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.advocate
.com/year-review/2014/12/30/year-bisexual-invisibility?page=full, archived at http://perma
.cc/XZ5R-8NPW. At the same time, the very fact that issues confronting bisexuals are get-
ting increased attention, including the issue of bisexual invisibility, shows that bisexuals
are gradually becoming more visible.
10. Peter O’Dowd, Sinema, First Openly Bisexual Member Of Congress, Represents
‘Changing Arizona,’ NPR BLOG, IT’S ALL POLITICS (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.npr.org
/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/01/08/168362011/sinema-first-openly-bisexual-member-of
-congress-represents-changing-arizona, archived at http://perma.cc/JQ5Q-GFC4.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Nazly Siadate, America’s 6 Out Bisexual Elected State Officials,
ADVOCATE .COM (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.advocate.com/politics/politicians/2012/08/23
/americas-six-out-bisexual-elected-state-officials, archived at http://perma.cc/FE5Q-FRNE.
13. See, e.g., Samantha Allen, Bisexuality’s Watershed Political Moment, THE DAILY
BEAST (Feb. 14, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/14/bisexuality-s
-watershed-political-moment.html, archived at http://perma.cc/X3V6-9J6A.
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comedian Margaret Cho,14 and sometimes reluctantly and even
somewhat clumsily, as in the case of Sex and the City actress Cynthia
Nixon.15 Additionally, bisexual characters are slowly becoming more
prevalent on television, and the authenticity of their portrayals of
bisexuality is, in some cases, improving.16 Even hate crimes against
bisexuals are beginning to gain attention,17 as is the plight of bisex-
ual asylum seekers.18 Although, just a few years ago, a popular bi-
sexual writer complained that LGBT rights organizations had not
taken on a single case on behalf of a bisexual plaintiff, the National
Center for Lesbian Rights changed that in 2010 when it undertook
representation of Stephen Apilado, LaRon Charles, and John Russ in
their suit against the North American Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance
(NAGAAA) for public accommodations discrimination based on the
players’ bisexuality.19
On the other hand, as Cynthia Nixon explained, bisexuals who are
visible—or who become so—continue to face a great deal of often bla-
tant prejudice: “I don’t pull out the ‘bisexual’ word because nobody
likes the bisexuals. Everybody likes to dump on the bisexuals.” 20
14. Margaret Cho Opens Up About Her Open Marriage, Outing John Travolta,
HUFFINGTON POST GAY VOICES (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08
/08/margaret-cho-open-marriage_n_3727268.html, archived at http://perma.cc/AYG9
-E48K; see also Steven Petrow, Is Anna Paquin’s Bisexuality ‘Past Tense’ Now That She’s




15. Kevin Sessums, Cynthia Nixon on Bisexuality & Her New Role in ‘Wit’, THE
DAILY BEAST (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/01/24/cynthia
-nixon-discusses-her-role-in-wit-her-cancer-bisexuality-and-her-kids.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/RPX2-8VPL.
16. Casey Quinlan, Bisexuality on TV: It’s Getting Better, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 25,
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2013/10/bisexuality-on-tv-its
-getting-better/280850/, archived at http://perma.cc/4TUG-LL9W.
17. See, e.g., Joshua Melvin, San Mateo Beating of Bisexual Man Charged as Hate
Crime, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.mercurynews.com/san
-mateo-county-news/ci_23824292/hate-crimes-charged-san-mateo-beating-bisexual-man,
archived at http://perma.cc/BQ2T-3ZJQ; Eliel Cruz, Bisexual College Student Shot Dead
in Front of His Home, ADVOCATE.COM (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.advocate.com/bisexuality
/2014/08/05/bisexual-college-student-shot-dead-front-his-home, archived at http://perma
.cc/M8WU-T535.
18. See, e.g., Eliel Cruz, Bisexual Jamaican in U.K. Released From Detention After
6 Weeks, ADVOCATE.COM (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.advocate.com/bisexuality/2014/09
/09/bisexual-jamaican-uk-released-detention-after-6-weeks, archived at http://perma.cc
/HC4Y-EDVM.
19. BAUMGARDNER, supra note 2, at 192; Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights,
NCLR Files Suit Challenging Discriminatory Athletic Policy: Athletes, Coach Humiliated
at Public Interrogation about Sexual Orientation (Apr. 20, 2010), available at http://www
.nclrights.org/press-room/press-release/nclr-files-suit-challenging-discriminatory-athletic
-policy, archived at http://perma.cc/GEH6-XW27.
20. Sessums, supra note 15.
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Actress Evan Rachel Wood experienced a similar reaction upon coming
out as bisexual, and she explains her current public affirmance of
her bisexual identity as a response to having “felt shamed from both
sides.” 21 What Nixon and Wood are describing is the phenomenon
of double discrimination: in other words, “the fact that bisexual people
can be discriminated against both by heterosexuals and by lesbian and
gay people.” 22 In addition to this mutual ostracization, bisexuals must
deal with the fact that their sexual identity is often not perceived to be
legitimate—either by those heterosexuals who are generally accept-
ing of homosexuality or by gay and lesbian persons themselves.23
Turning to the academic realm, there are indications of increasing
visibility in that sphere as well. Although historically, if gathered at
all, data regarding bisexuals were usually conflated with data about
gays and lesbians,24 in the past few years, social scientists and others
have begun to gather data specifically about bisexuals.25 The results
that are beginning to emerge are alarming. Recent health and eco-
nomic data demonstrate that bisexual men and women have much
21. Greg Hernandez, Evan Rachel Wood Tells Gay Star News She Wants to Help
End Stigma About Bisexuality, GAY STAR NEWS (May 27, 2014), http://www.gaystarnews
.com/article/evan-rachel-wood-tells-gay-star-news-she-wants-help-end-stigma-about
-bisexuality270514, archived at http://perma.cc/P9WW-DJ4L.
22. BARKER ET AL., supra note 2, at 21. The discrimination that bisexuals face from
other LGBT persons, particularly lesbians and gays, is an example of intragroup discrimi-
nation. Bisexuals are not unique in being the victims of intragroup discrimination, but
the extent to which it is still seen as societally acceptable to overtly discriminate against
bisexuals within both the LGBT and straight communities makes the situation of bisexuals
at least very unusual, if not unique. For general information on intragroup discrimination
in the context of race and sex, see, e.g., Enrique Schaerer, Intragroup Discrimination in
the Workplace: The Case for “Race Plus,” 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 58–60 (2010).
Additionally, the fact that bisexuals face overt, culturally sanctioned discrimination
from both the LGBT and straight communities appears to make it more difficult for them
to access the support needed to cope with discrimination. See, e.g., S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS
COMM’N LGBT ADVISORY COMM., supra note 1, at 12.
23. Brent Chamberlain, Stonewall Workplace Guides: Bisexual People in the Work-
place: Practical Advice for Employers, STONEWALL, 2–3 (2012), http://www.stonewall
.org.uk/documents/bisexual_people.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E3KA-ZUTP; see
also BARKER ET AL., supra note 2, at 21; Mezey, supra note 4, at 116–18. For an example
of an assertion of the illegitimacy of bisexuality by a lesbian, see Julie Bindel, Where’s
the Politics in Sex?, HUFFINGTON POST GAY VOICES (June 12, 2012), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/julie-bindel/where-is-the-politics-in-_b_1589435.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/CL42-B2QC. It is noteworthy to see such blatant prejudice against bisexual
women in a left-wing publication like the Huffington Post. Bindel clearly subscribes to
the stereotypes of bisexuals as greedy and selfish, as well as hypersexual, which are dis-
cussed elsewhere in this Article. Anyone who needs an antidote to the intolerance in the
Bindel piece may want to look at Cindy Rizzo, When You Use Your Identity As A Hammer,
Everything Looks Like A Nail, DO I LOOK LIKE A WRITER IN THIS? ON WRITING, IDEAS,
LESFIC, LGBT ISSUES, AND OTHER LATE MIDLIFE THOUGHTS (Sept. 12, 2014), https://
cindyrizzo.wordpress.com/2014/09/12/when-you-use-your-identity-as-a-hammer-every
thing-looks-like-a-nail, archived at http://perma.cc/5C2V-GDUL.
24. S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N LGBT ADVISORY COMM., supra note 1, at 3.
25. See id. at 3, 11–12; Chamberlain, supra note 23.
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higher rates of suicide ideation than gay men and lesbians respec-
tively, that bisexual women are more likely to experience frequent
mental distress than lesbians and that they have poorer general health
than lesbians, and that bisexual men and women are more likely to
live in poverty than gay men and lesbians respectively.26 Moreover, bi-
sexual women also appear to be at greater risk of intimate partner
violence than gay men, lesbians, or heterosexual men or women.27
However, services to bisexuals to address these problems and re-
search on their experiences and challenges are undoubtedly hampered
by the fact that bisexual-focused programs and organizations receive
only a minute portion of the grants that are awarded to benefit the
various segments of the LGBT population.28 Indeed, bisexual-focused
organizations and programs received less than 0.3% of the funding
that was awarded to either lesbian-focused or gay male-focused orga-
nizations and programs over a forty-year period ($84,356 awarded to
bisexual organizations and programs compared to $34,173,243
awarded to gay male-focused organizations and programs and
$30,470,934 awarded to lesbian-focused organizations and programs).29
Another problem is that bisexuals themselves appear to be con-
tributing to their invisibility, partly out of fear of discrimination and,
in some cases, out of ambivalence about the bisexual label itself, which,
in some instances, could be characterized as internalized biphobia.30
For instance, a recent study by Pew Research Center found that bisex-
uals were less than half as likely as gays and lesbians to have told
most or all of the important people in their lives about their sexual ori-
entations, and a 2013 survey of employees in Britain revealed that bi-
sexuals are only roughly one third as likely as gays and lesbians to feel
comfortable being out in the workplace.31 And, in the workplace,
26. S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N LGBT ADVISORY COMM., supra note 1, at 12–13, 27.
27. See Naomi G. Goldberg & Ilan H. Meyer, Brief Note, Sexual Orientation Disparities
in History of Intimate Partner Violence: Results From the California Health Interview Sur-
vey,28 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1109, 1109 (2013); accord BARKER ET AL., supra note 2,
at 22 (comparing risks faced by bisexual people to those faced by lesbian and gay people).
28. Anthony Bowen, Forty Years of LGBTQ Philanthropy: 1970–2010, LGBT FUNDERS,
33 (2012), http://www.lgbtfunders.org/files/40years_lgbtqphilanthrophy.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/M7S6-EJ2R.
29. Id.
30. Helena See & Ruth Hunt, Bisexuality and Identity: The Double-Edged Sword:
Stonewall Research into Bisexual Experience, 11 J. BISEXUALITY 290, 292–94 (2011); see
also BARKER ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (defining biphobia); accord Petrow, supra note 14
(describing a bisexual friend’s experiences of discussing her bisexuality and quoting her
statement that bisexuality is “exhausting trying to explain . . . .”). Besides biphobia, other
possible reasons to reject or feel ambivalent about the bisexual label include the fact that
the word itself semantically incorporates a notion of the gender binary, personal dislike
of labels, and reluctance to espouse any identity.
31. A SURVEY OF LGBT AMERICANS: ATTITUDES, EXPERIENCES AND VALUES IN CHANG-
ING TIMES, PEW RESEARCH CENTER  44–45 (June 13, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends
.org/files/2013/06/SDT_LGBT-Americans_06-2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2SLP
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this reluctance to come out contributes to feelings of dissatisfaction
at work.32
However, in evaluating bisexuals’ lower rates of outness at work
and in other contexts, it is important to keep in mind that the process
of revealing one’s bisexuality often differs in important ways from the
arguably more straightforward process of coming out as lesbian or gay.
For example, coming out as bisexual often requires educating others
about what bisexuality is, and the person coming out may find herself
“constantly . . . questioned and asked to justify” her sexual orienta-
tion.33 Relatedly, because bisexuality may not be seen as a legitimate
orientation by those to whom a bisexual person comes out, profes-
sion of the identity may be viewed as an indication that the bisexual
person is obstinately refusing to choose between heterosexuality
and homosexuality.34 Additionally, the fact that bisexuals tend to be
imputed a heterosexual or homosexual sexual orientation based on
their being partnered with an opposite-sex or same-sex person may
make coming out and staying out as bisexual more labor-intensive
than coming out as lesbian or gay,35 and those in opposite-sex rela-
tionships who come out as bisexual may be accused of unfairly taking
advantage of heterosexual privilege.36 In other words, the status of
being out as bisexual to most or all of the important people in one’s life
may be viewed with more suspicion than a lesbian or gay identity
and may be harder to maintain. Finally, some bisexuals have re-
ported that they do not identify with the concept of coming out.37
As a result of these unique challenges and circumstances, it is im-
portant not to assume that bisexuals’ lower likelihood of being out and
visible is a reflection of a personal failure or weakness. On the other
hand, it should be recognized that concealing one’s identity causes
harm to those who do so,38 and thus efforts should be made to make
the coming out experiences of those bisexuals who identify with that
process easier. As with other invisible minorities, the invisibility of
bisexuality presents a double bind. If bisexuals come out at work
-8ZK4; Ruth Hunt & Vignesh Ashok, Workplace Equality Index: Five Year Review, STONE-
WALL, 50 (2013), http://www.stonewall.org.uk/documents/workplace_equality_index__fI’ve
_year_review.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/B7DZ-D2MW.
32. See & Hunt, supra note 30, at 293.
33. See, e.g., Human Rights Campaign, Issue: Coming Out: Bisexual (2014) (on file
with author); Chamberlain, supra note 23, at 3–5 (quoting interview respondent Niamh,
as well as the experiences of other respondents).
34. See Chamberlain, supra note 23, at 5.
35. See, e.g., BARKER ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (describing the practice of “assuming
people’s sexuality on the basis of their current partner” as a form of biphobia).
36. Accord Rizzo, supra note 23.
37. See, e.g., BAUMGARDNER, supra note 2, at 118–19, 209–10.
38. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility
Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 527–28 (1998).
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they will likely be happier but also will likely face more discrimination,
particularly since evidence suggests that visible bisexuals face more
stigma from heterosexuals than do gays and lesbians.39
B. Our Survey
In order to gain an empirical understanding of the reasons for
bisexuals’ invisibility in the legal realm, and in employment discrimi-
nation case law specifically, we decided to ask bisexuals themselves
and others with fluid identities (such as those who identify as pan-
sexual or omnisexual40) whether they had experienced employment
discrimination and whether they had sought relief of any kind.
We explored these questions via an online survey that was ap-
proved by Hamline University’s Institutional Review Board. In design-
ing the survey, we elected to define bisexuality in terms of sexual
identity rather than solely based on either our respondents’ reports
of sexual behavior or even their reports of attraction to both sexes
if coupled with a homosexual or heterosexual identity. We took this
approach for several reasons. One is that we wanted to include those
who have attractions to both sexes rather than focusing solely on those
who have engaged in sexual behavior or have had relationships with
both sexes because, in accord with the prevailing scientific view, we
see attraction as more indicative of sexual orientation than sexual
behavior.41 Additionally, we view identity as generally more culturally
salient than the more objective concept of sexual orientation42 (and
39. See Gregory M. Herek, Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward Bisexual Men and Women
in the United States, 39 THE J. OF SEX RESEARCH 264, 271 (2002) [hereinafter Herek, Heter-
osexuals]; see also BARKER ET AL., supra note 2, at 24 (discussing workplace discrimination
against bisexuals); Heidi Bruins Green et al., Working Bi: Preliminary Findings from a
Survey on Workplace Experiences of Bisexual People, 11 J. OF BISEXUALITY 300, 313 (2011)
(reporting a relationship between outness and workplace satisfaction among bisexuals).
40. “Omnisexual” and “pansexual” generally refer to “people who recognize the exis-
tence of more than two sexes and/or more than two genders and can be attracted to many
characteristics of a person independent of or beyond the classifications of male and/or
female or man and/or woman.” Matt Kailey, Transgender Issues 101: Pansexual, Omni-
sexual, and Queer, EXAMINER.COM (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.examiner.com/article/trans
gender-issues-101-pansexual-omnisexual-and-queer, archived at http://perma.cc/LG4Q
-SS4X. Notably, we are using “fluid” differently than Professor Diamond uses it in SEXUAL
FLUIDITY: UNDERSTANDING WOMEN’S LOVE & DESIRE. See DIAMOND, supra note 1. Our
use of “fluid” refers to identities that themselves incorporate a notion of fluidity or
potential for attraction to both or multiple sexes, whereas Professor Diamond is using
fluidity to refer to changes in sexual attraction over time. Id. at 3–4. For instance, a
person who identified as lesbian in her twenties and then as heterosexual in her thirties
would fit Professor Diamond’s definition of fluidity but not ours.
41. DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 12.
42. “[S]exual orientation” and “sexual identity” are closely related but distinct terms.
As Professor Lisa Diamond explains:
“[S]exual orientation” . . . mean[s] a consistent, enduring pattern of sexual
desire for individuals of the same sex, the other sex, or both sexes, regardless
of whether this pattern of desire is manifested in sexual behavior. . . . “Sexual
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thus as a more likely basis of discrimination). For example, a person
who harbors same-sex attraction but never outwardly acknowledges
it is unlikely to face discrimination based on it.43 Identity, however,
implies an acknowledgment and avowal of one’s attractions and,
therefore, if known by others, may well trigger discrimination. Finally,
we wanted to recognize, as much as possible in the course of collecting
quantitative data, each individual’s right of self-naming and self-
determination relating to his or her sexuality.44
Our respondents reported significant levels of employment dis-
crimination and yet very few of them had sought any kind of relief.
None had sought relief in the court system. Given the aforemen-
tioned health and mental health statistics and the effects that dis-
crimination can have on health and mental health,45 the high level
of discrimination revealed in our survey results is not surprising.
This Article presents the results of the survey. It then examines
the likely reasons for bisexual invisibility in the case law and bisexu-
als’ apparent reluctance to sue for discrimination in the workplace,
and it recommends steps that judges, lawyers, and employers can take
to improve bisexuals’ prospects for remedying discrimination and
accessing justice. It concludes with suggestions for further research.
identity” refers to a culturally organized conception of the self, usually “les-
bian/gay,” “bisexual,” or “heterosexual.” . . . [W]e cannot presume that these
identities correspond to particular patterns of behavior.
Id. Thus, “sexual orientation” is an objective term based on the content of a person’s de-
sires, whereas “sexual identity” can be thought of as the sexual orientation label that a
person recognizes as her own, sometimes only privately but often both privately and pub-
licly. Because we focused on respondents’ self-identification in our survey, our survey
results provide information about bisexual- and fluid-identified respondents, rather than
those who may technically have a bisexual orientation but who do not identify that way.
43. [I]t would appear to be the person who either self-identified with a soci-
etally disfavored sexual preference or who was involuntarily identified by
others as exhibiting such a preference who would most need the protections
of an anti-discrimination law. By engaging in the political act of express-
ing her identity, such a person makes herself uniquely vulnerable to dis-
crimination (or is made so in the case of involuntary identification).
Ann E. Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1461, 1477–78
(2011) (footnotes and citations omitted).
44. See, e.g., Nathan Patrick Rambukkana, Uncomfortable Bridges: The Bisexual
Politics of Outing Polyamory, 4 J. BISEXUALITY 141, 152 (2004).
45. Mark L. Hatzenbuehler et al., Structural Stigma and All-Cause Mortality in
Sexual Minority Populations, 103 SOC. SCI. & MEDICINE 33, 33 (2014) (reporting that the
life expectancy of sexual minorities living in communities with high levels of anti-gay
prejudice is twelve years shorter than for those living in low-prejudice communities); Lori
E. Ross et al., Perceived Determinants of Mental Health for Bisexual People: A Quali-
tative Examination, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 496, 497 (2010) (detailing bisexual partic-
ipants’ perception that biphobia and monosexism played critical roles in their mental
health experiences); Mark L. Hatzenbuehler et al., The Impact of Institutional Discrimina-
tion on Psychiatric Disorders in Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Populations: A Prospective
Study, 100 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 452 (2010) (reporting increased rates of psychiatric
disorders, especially mood disorders and generalized anxiety disorder, among LGB respon-
dents living in states that passed anti-marriage equality constitutional amendments).
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Part I of this Article describes the existing case law pertaining to
discrimination against bisexuals and then explains the ways in which
courts and lawyers have obsfuscated bisexuality and denied its legiti-
macy. Part II begins with a literature review of social science research
on bisexuals and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
peoples’ experiences with employment discrimination. It then presents
the results of our survey and explores the qualitative evidence avail-
able on bisexuals’ experiences with workplace discrimination. Part
III examines the limited case law available and the social science
research pertaining to bisexuals to shed light on the ways in which
lawyers, courts, and employers may be failing bisexuals who have
experienced employment discrimination. It also suggests ways to
improve bisexuals’ experiences in the workplace and with the justice
system. The last Part concludes with suggestions for further research.
I. BI INVISIBILITY IN THE COURTROOM AND THE CASE REPORTER
Currently, twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have
laws in place that bar sexual orientation discrimination against public
and private employees.46 Although there is currently no broad-based
federal law protecting workers from such discrimination, public les-
bian, gay and bisexual (LGB) employees have had mixed success rely-
ing on the equal protection clause and the First Amendment, and,
additionally, an Executive Order was recently adopted that bans sex-
ual orientation and gender identity discrimination by federal contrac-
tors.47 Additionally, nine states have sexual orientation discrimination
laws that protect only public employees, and many localities have
protections of varying scope in place as well.48 Finally, employers’ non-
discrimination policies may serve as a source of protection in some in-
stances. Notably, statutory and administrative definitions of sexual
46. See Statewide Employment Laws and Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Jan. 16,
2015), available at http://www.hrc.org/state_maps, archived at http://perma.cc/9ZM9-LS56.
47. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 449–50 (bisexual guidance
counselor held to have neither equal protection nor First Amendment protection for sexual
orientation disclosure); Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1285 (D. Utah
1998) (lesbian teacher held to have First Amendment protection for disclosure of sexual
orientation); Ambris v. City of Cleveland, 2012 WL 5874367, 116 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 949, 96 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,701 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (granting City’s motion to dis-
miss equal protection claim); Gill v. Devlin, 867 F. Supp. 2d 849, 859 (N.D. Tex. 2012)
(denying motion for judgment on the pleadings in equal protection case); Exec Order No.
1,367,279, 79 Fed. Reg. 42971 (July 21, 2014). We use ‘LGB’ rather than ‘LGBT,’ the latter
of which includes transgender persons, simply to separate out sexual orientation from gen-
der identity. We firmly support antidiscrimination protections for transgender persons.
48. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 46; Edward J. Reeves & Lainie D.
Decker, Before ENDA: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Protections in the Work-
place Under Federal Law, 20 L. & SEXUALITY 61, 64 (2011).
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orientation in discrimination laws do tend to explicitly include bi-
sexuality.49 Thus, although existing statutory protections for LGB
people are far from ideal, bisexual employees have state law pro-
tections against employment discrimination in twenty-one states and
the District of Columbia, and some bisexual workers outside of those
states have protection because they are public workers or employed by
federal contractors or because of a local ordinance or an individual
employer’s policy.
Nonetheless, although bisexuals are the largest sexual minority
group in the United States,50 electronically available court decisions in-
volving bisexual plaintiffs’ claims of employment discrimination are
rare compared to those involving gay, lesbian, and heterosexual plain-
tiffs,51 and it seems to be virtually unheard of for a bisexual plaintiff
49. See Tweedy, supra note 43, at 1463; Robin Cheryl Miller, Validity, Construction,
and Application of State Enactment, Order, or Regulation Expressly Prohibiting Sexual
Orientation Discrimination, 82 A.L.R.5th 1, § 2[a] (2000).
50. S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMON LGBT ADVISORY COMM., supra note 1, at 1.
51. We found a total of eleven employment discrimination cases brought by bisexual
plaintiffs in the ALLCASES database on Westlaw, and only four (or possibly five) of those
were based on state laws that prohibited sexual orientation discrimination: Flood v. Bank
of America, No. 14-0168 (1st Cir. Feb. 27, 2015) (reinstating two of plaintiff's sexual orien-
tation discrimination claims under Maine law); Rowland, 730 F.2d at 446 (First Amend-
ment and equal protection claim brought by public employee); Davis v. Signius Investment
Corp./Answernet, 2013 WL 1339758, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 26, 2013) (bisexual female
plaintiff’s Title VII claim dismissed because sexual orientation is not a protected class);
Dawkins v. Richmond Cnty. Schs., 2012 WL 1580455, at *6 (M.D.N.C. May 4, 2012) (grant-
ing motion of gay/bisexual male plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis and allowing his
equal protection claim based on sexual orientation to go forward against one defendant,
while dismissing his Title VII claim and disallowing him from proceeding on equal pro-
tection grounds against another defendant); Blaylock v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 2009 WL
2606245, at *24 (D.N.J. 2009) (Title VII claim premised on sexual orientation discrimina-
tion dismissed because of insufficient evidence); Parrella v. Lawrence & Mem’l Hosp.,
2009 WL 1279290, at *3 (D. Conn. 2009) (Title VII claim based on sexual orientation dis-
crimination dismissed because sexual orientation is not a statutorily protected class);
Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1119–28 (9th Cir. 2008) (bisexual
plaintiff’s state-law employment discrimination claim was barred by statute of limita-
tions); Cullen v. Southington Oral & Maxillofacial Surgeons P.C., Docket No. HHDCV603
7579S, 2014 WL 5571580, at *6, *8 (Super. Ct. Conn. Sept. 30, 2014) (granting summary
judgment with respect to a bisexual plaintiff’s sexual orientation discrimination claim
under state law while allowing her other claims to go forward); Egan v. Hamline United
Methodist Church, 679 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding bisexual church
music director’s employment discrimination claim not actionable because of religious ex-
emption in state discrimination law); Janssen v. Inc. Vil. of Rockville Ctr., 59 A.D.3d 15,
16–17, (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (Title VII claim based on sexual orientation discrimination
dismissed because sexual orientation is not a protected class but plaintiff granted leave
to amend complaint to properly allege the elements of state law harassment claim);
Zalewski v. M.A.R.S. Enter., Ltd., 561 F. Supp. 601, 602 (D. Del. 1982) (summary
judgment granted on bisexual male plaintiff’s quid pro sexual harassment claim under
Title VII because of failure to comply with procedural requirements).
Thus, of the cases brought by bisexual plaintiffs cited above, only Flood, Johnson,
Cullen, and Egan appeared to include sexual orientation-based employment discrimination
claims rooted in state law. It is unclear whether the state law claim in Janssen was based
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to succeed in such a claim on the merits.52
Ironically, the most prominent appearance of bisexuals in em-
ployment discrimination case law is in the role of the so-called bisexual
harasser, a largely hypothetical character who perpetrates discrimi-
nation with impunity because her treatment of both sexes is equally
bad and therefore not actionable under Title VII.53 The confinement
of bisexuals to this negative and largely hypothetical role in the case
law may well be rooted in the popular stereotype that bisexuals are
greedily attempting to have their cake and eat it too.54 Rather than
bisexuals’ being subordinated in the workplace due to heteronorma-
tivity, occasional homonormativity, and outright prejudice, judges and
on sex or sexual orientation. A later order describes the claim as one of sexual harassment,
suggesting that it was a gender-based claim, Janssen, 94 A.D.3d at 949, although the evi-
dence described in the 2008 order appeared to relate to sexual orientation discrimination.
To get a sense of the greater abundance of state law, sexual orientation-based employ-
ment discrimination claims brought by lesbian, gay, and even heterosexual plaintiffs,
see Miller, supra note 49, at §§ 7–10. While the sexual orientation of the plaintiffs was
not clear in all of Miller’s case summaries, most of the summaries identified the plaintiff’s
orientation as being lesbian, gay, or heterosexual. In those summaries in which the orien-
tation was unclear, in all cases except one, examination of the opinion or order itself either
revealed that the plaintiff was lesbian, gay, or heterosexual (rather than bisexual) or
did not reveal the orientation at all. Compare Walker v. City of Holyoke, 523 F. Supp.
2d 86 (D. Mass. 2007) (lesbian plaintiff); Howard Univ. v. Green, 652 A.2d 41, 49 n.11
(D.C. 1994) (heterosexual plaintiff); Young v. Ill. Human Rights Comm’n, 74 N.E.2d
385, 388 (Ill. App. 2012) (homosexual plaintiff); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d
211, 213 (2d Cir. 2005) (lesbian plaintiff), with Thomas v. Coleman Enters., 2000 WL
385479, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (sexual orientation of plaintiff unclear but complaint
involved anti-lesbian remark); Taylor v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 871 N.Y.S.2d 568,
571–72 (App. 2008) (sexual orientation of plaintiff unclear but allegations included anti-
gay conduct and comments and expressions of distaste for homosexuals); Jones v. Lodge
at Torrey Pines P’ship, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 379, 385 (4th Dist. 2007) (sexual orientation of
plaintiff unclear but allegations involved gay-bashing comments), as mod. 42 Cal.4th 1158
(Cal. 2008); Cnty. of Onondaga v. Mayock, 910 N.Y.S.2d 628 (App. Div. 2010) (sexual
orientation discrimination alleged without further specification). Of all the cases Miller
discusses in the cited sections, only one, Egan, clearly involved a bisexual plaintiff.
52. To date, the only case we found in which a bisexual employee ultimately suc-
ceeded on the merits in a sexual orientation discrimination case was a harassment case
from the United Kingdom. See Harassment of Bisexual Employee, 212 EQUAL OPPOR-
TUNITIES REV. 29 (May 2011) (summarizing Rosik v. Wood and others, case no.2704114/09
(Dec. 13, 2010)). However, in a somewhat well-known American case, plaintiff Majorie
Rowland had succeeded at the trial level on her constitutionally based employment dis-
crimination claims against a school district, but the Sixth Circuit reversed. Rowland,
730 F.2d at 446. Additionally, in Flood, No. 14-1068, the First Circuit reversed the district
court's dismissal on summary judgment of two of a bisexual plaintiff's sexual orientation
claims under Maine law. Whether Flood will ultimately prevail remains to be seen.
Although we learned of the Rosik case in the U.K. by researching periodicals, our
caselaw search was generally limited to United States state and federal cases available
on Westlaw.
53. See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 1, at 440–42; HR Agenda, HR BRIEFING 8 (Nov. 15,
2000).
54. See BARKER ET AL., supra note 2, at 20 (describing the stereotype that bisexuals
are greedy and want to have their cake and eat it too).
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litigants imagine that bisexuals are getting away with something,
just as they are thought to do in their personal lives. In actuality,
however, an equal opportunity harasser could be any sexual orien-
tation: harassment need not be motivated by sexual attraction.55
In addition to the lack of employment discrimination cases
brought by bisexual plaintiffs, lawyers, judges, and justices have
also used tactics that elide the existence of bisexuals.56 One of the
most blatant examples of this was Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the
Majority in Romer v. Evans.57 Although the Colorado law that the
Court struck down explicitly listed bisexuals, along with gays and
lesbians, as intended objects of its discriminatory bar, the Court
elected to refer to the affected class as homosexual persons or gays
and lesbians.58 While this framing seems innocuous in itself, it has
the effect of making bisexuality invisible to those reading the opin-
ion and of implicitly denying the injustice that bisexuals experi-
enced at the hands of the Colorado voters who passed the law.
Another important example of a judge’s elision of bisexuality
occurred in a recent federal district court case, Apilado v. North
American Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance, which was brought by
bisexual and apparently somewhat closeted softball players alleging
that the NAGAAA discriminated against them based on their sex-
ual orientation in violation of Washington’s public accommodations
law.59 The NAGAAA had a rule that each team could have no more
than two heterosexuals, and, during the NAGAAA’s 2008 world
series, another team challenged the plaintiffs’ team, D2, on the
basis that it included more than two heterosexual players.60 Five of
D2’s players, including the three plaintiffs, were summoned to a
hearing where, in the presence of more than twenty-five people,
they were forced to answer intrusive questions about their sexual
55. See, e.g., John W. Whitehead, Eleventh Hour Amendment or Serious Business:
Sexual Harassment and the United States Supreme Court’s 1997–1998 Term, 71 TEMP.
L. REV. 773, 774 (1998) (“[S]exual harassment flows from a disparity of power.”).
56. Elizabeth Glazer, Sexual Reorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. 997, 1033–35 (2012)
(describing Ted Olson’s questioning of his client, Sandy Stier, in Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010)); Yoshino, supra note 1, at 367 (discussing the
Majority’s framing of the issue in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
57. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). A much more inclusive approach was proffered by Judge
Norris in a 1998 Ninth Circuit opinion that was later withdrawn. See Mezey, supra note
4, at 125 (quoting Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1429 n.1 (9th Cir.
1988), amended, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989)
(en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990)). Similarly, Judge Berzon uses inclusive
language in her concurrence in Latta v. Otter. 771 F.3d 456, 495 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon,
J., concurring).
58. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624; Yoshino, supra note 1, at 367.
59. 792 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1155–56 (W.D. Wash. 2011); see also Apilado v. North Am.
Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance, 2011 WL 5563206, at *1–2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2011).
60. Apilado, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
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attractions and practices.61 In response to one plaintiff’s statement
that he was attracted to both men and women, an NAGAAA member
stated “this is not a bisexual world series—this is a gay world se-
ries.” 62 Ultimately, the NAGAAA’s protest committee voted the three
plaintiffs to be heterosexual and their team was forced to forfeit its
second-place finish.63 The NAGAAA’s treatment of plaintiffs is partic-
ularly disturbing given that its mission explicitly included promotion
of the participation of bisexuals.64 Yet, rather than allowing plaintiffs
to claim or prove bisexuality, the organization utilized and enforced
rules that drew a dichotomy between gay and heterosexual, leaving
no room for the existence of bisexuals.65 Thus, in a move to enforce
homonormativity that is similar to the discriminatory actions that
some of our bisexual respondents reported having experienced from
other LGBT non-profits, the NAGAAA appears to have given lip-
service to bisexuality without meaningfully allowing bisexual people
to participate as such.66
The district court, after acknowledging the plaintiffs’ framing
of the case as being about bisexuality in an early order,67 apparently
failed to grasp that rules drawing a sharp dichotomy between gay and
straight with no space for a middle ground exclude bisexuals.68 Thus,
although plaintiffs raised the NAGAAA’s discrimination against
bisexuals in their brief and alerted the court to the NAGAAA’s ac-
knowledgment that its constituency included bisexuals,69 the court
upheld the NAGAAA’s First Amendment right to draw the dichotomy
in order to limit the participation of heterosexuals without recogniz-
ing the rules’ harmful effects on bisexuals.70 Instead of addressing
61. Press Release, National Center for Lesbian Rights, Parties Settle Case Challenging





63. Id.; Glazer, supra note 56, at 1027–28.
64. Apilado, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.
65. Id. at 1155. This sort of dichotomous thinking is condemned by Naomi Mezey.
Mezey, supra note 4, at 121.
66. Sadly, many LGBT organizations similarly appear to only nominally include
bisexuals as constituents. See, e.g., S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N LGBT ADVISORY COMM.,
supra note 1, at 31.
67. Apilado, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
68. Apilado v. North Am. Gay Ameteur Athletic Alliance, 2011 WL 5563206, at *1–3
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2011).
69. Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Granting Partial Summary Judgment to
NAGAAA on its First Amendment Defense to Plaintiffs’ Claim of Sexual Orientation
Discrimination under RCW 49.60 and Request for Judgment in Plaintiffs’ Favor, at 5,
North Am. Gay Ameteur Athletic Alliance, No. C10-00682 JCC, 2011 WL 5563206 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 10, 2011).
70. Apilado, 2011 WL 5563206, at *1–3.
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the rule’s effects on the bisexual plaintiffs as bisexuals, it somewhat
myopically framed the issue alternately as whether the NAGAAA
had a right to exclude “straight or closeted players” or “people who
chose not to identify as predominantly interested in the same sex.” 71
Given that discrimination based on bisexuality was a central issue
in the case, this framing indicates a significant blind spot.
The district court’s grant of partial summary judgment appears
to have been based on a combination of an unduly broad, although un-
elaborated, reading of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale72 and a lack of
understanding of what constitutes discrimination against bisexuals.
Although the court’s reading of Dale appears to have been errone-
ous,73 if interpreting Dale to grant the NAGAAA the First Amend-
ment right to discriminate against bisexuals despite purporting to
support bisexual players in its mission, it would have been prefera-
ble for the court to at least acknowledge the harmful effects of the
NAGAAA’s rules on bisexuals. This approach would have avoided
making bisexuals (and the discrimination against them) invisible
in their own case.
Nonetheless, as with Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in
Romer, it is far from clear that the court in Apilado bore any ill will
towards bisexuals. It may be that the court simply failed to compre-
hend plaintiffs’ legal argument because it did not understand bisex-
uality itself and that the court therefore avoided explicitly addressing
71. Id. at *2–3.
72. 530 U.S. 640, 640–41 (2000).
73. Although Dale was worded very broadly, the court’s decision is in tension with,
and even inconsistent with, Dale, given that the Boy Scouts of America did provide some
pre-litigation evidence of the organization’s disapproval of homosexuality, whereas, in
Apilado, the NAGAAA’s mission specifically listed bisexuals as being part of its constit-
uency. Dale, 530 U.S. at 651–53; Apilado v. North Am. Gay Ameteur Athletic Alliance, 792
F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1159 (W.D. Wash. 2011); see also Andrew Koppelman, Should Non-
commercial Associations Have an Absolute Right to Discriminate?, 67 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 27, 30–31 (2011) (describing the broadness of Dale). Additionally, the Court in Dale
could colorably read the Boy Scouts’ mission as being inconsistent with homosexuality,
although it was necessary to assume a homophobic point of view to do so. 530 U.S. at 650.
However, given the NAGAAA’s professed support of bisexuals, there was no way to read
its mission as expressing an intention to limit their participation. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the Court in Dale specifically stated that it was not saying that an expressive asso-
ciation can erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere
acceptance of a member from a particular group would impair its message. Id. at 653.
It is possible that, if the Apilado Court had understood how the NAGAAA’s rules and
actions discriminated against the bisexual plaintiffs in direct contravention of its own mis-
sion, it would not have held the NAGAAA to be shielded by the First Amendment under
Dale. Accord Stevens v. Optimum Health Inst. San Diego, 810 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1094
(S.D. Cal. 2011) (applying Dale and holding that forced admittance of the plaintiff, a dis-
abled person, would not infringe on the defendant religious organization’s right of ex-
pressive association). Indeed, granting an organization the First Amendment right to
discriminate in direct contravention of its own mission would stretch Dale beyond all
reasonable limits.
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the argument in its second partial summary judgment order. Re-
gardless, however, the decision was harmful to the plaintiffs and other
bisexuals in not acknowledging a principal basis of the NAGAAA’s
discrimination and in not acknowledging even the possibility of bisexu-
ality as a legitimate orientation. Fortunately, after the decision, the
case settled, and NAGAAA agreed as part of the settlement to clarify
in its Instruments of Governance that bisexual individuals shall not
be subject to Roster limitations, to amend its rules to be more inclu-
sive, and to take other proactive measures.74
In addition to judicial obfuscations of bisexuality, lawyers some-
times strategically engage in similar practices, usually on behalf of
gay and lesbian clients, in order to simplify their clients’ claims or
to make their clients appear similar to heterosexuals.75 For example,
Roberta Kaplan, the attorney representing Edith Windsor in United
States v. Windsor, used the terms “gay marriage,” “straight marriage,”
“marriages of gay couples,” and “marriages of straight people” in her
brief and oral argument on behalf of Ms. Windsor, reportedly because
she believes that those are the terms used by people who are com-
fortable with gays and lesbians.76 However, in contrast to the terms
“same-sex marriage” and “different-sex marriage,” this terminology
erases bisexuals by suggesting that the only two relevant groups are
gays and lesbians on the one hand and straight people on the other.
Bisexuals are nowhere acknowledged.
Unfortunately, similar terminology, specifically use of the terms
‘lesbians and gays’ and ‘gay people,’ is used in the plaintiffs’ merits
brief before the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, a case
which is pending before the Court as this Article goes to press.77 Thus,
the trend of advocates for lesbian and gay plaintiffs erasing bisexu-
als continues.
Additionally, Ms. Kaplan’s merits brief in Windsor argues against
the concept of sexual fluidity and specifically avers that Ms. Windsor
74. Settlement Agreement between Steven Apilado, LaRon Charles and John Ross




75. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, “Like Race” Arguments, in WHAT’S LEFT OF THEORY:
NEW WORK ON THE POLITICS OF LITERARY THEORY 52–53 (Judith Butler et al. eds., 2000).
76. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Pamela S. Karlan et al., Brief on
the Merits for Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307,
2013 WL 701228, at *56 (Feb. 26, 2013); see Oral Argument Tr., United States v. Windsor,
No. 12-307, 2013 WL 1232726, at *102 (March 27, 2013); Audio recording: Roberta A.
Kaplan, Keynote Speaker, AALS Section on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Issues Luncheon, The Ass’n of American Law Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 5, 2014).
77. Susan L. Sommer et al., Brief for Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556
(February 27, 2015), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/henry
_oh_20150227_petitioners-brief.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HMK2-DG7E.
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is a lesbian despite her brief marriage to a man.78 While there is no
reason to question the truth of Ms. Kaplan’s averment regarding
her client’s sexual identity, it is interesting and troubling that attor-
neys feel compelled to prove their clients in same-sex marriage cases
to be lesbian or gay as distinguished from bisexual, although there
is no legal reason that bisexuals should have fewer rights.79
A similar example occurred in Ted Olson’s questioning of his
client Sandy Stier in the trial on California’s Proposition 8.80 Ms. Stier
had previously been married to a man, and her attorney asked her to
confirm that she really was gay, apparently on the assumption that
she needed to be gay (rather than bisexual) to claim a right to mar-
riage (or possibly on the assumption that she would have a stronger
claim to the right as a lesbian than she would as a bisexual): “How
convinced are you that you are gay? You’ve lived with a husband. You
said you loved him. Some people might say, ‘Well, it’s this and then it’s
that and it could be this again.’ Answer that.” 81 Stier confirmed
that she was gay, and we can only assume that she in fact identifies
that way.82 Again, what is interesting about the exchange is that
Olson apparently felt that it was important to rule out bisexuality in
order to win the case,83 an intuition that was arguably supported by
one of the questions Judge Walker posed to the parties prior to
closing arguments.84
Drawing parallels to interracial marriage, it would be surprising
to find evidence of an attorney’s having questioned Mr. Loving, the
white male plaintiff in Loving v. Virginia,85 about whether he were
sure that he could only be attracted to black women. Most people in
78. Karlan et al., supra note 76, at *26–27.
79. One reason that attorneys may be making this argument, which is related to the
concerns about demonstrating immutability that are discussed below, is that “the ability
of a given class of plaintiffs to succeed in bringing anti-discrimination claims [has tended
to] derive[ ] largely from the group’s ability to successfully analogize their situation to
that of an oppressed racial group . . . .” Tweedy, supra note 43, at 1469. Thus, the idea that
sexual orientation is consistent over time, if proven, could conceivably aid in making a
plaintiff’s case more convincing because it would allow the case to closely align with the
racial paradigm. However, the harms that this strategy inflicts on bisexuals clearly war-
rant reconsideration of this approach. Additionally, it is arguably a somewhat of a hollow
victory if LGBT rights are premised on an incorrect understanding of sexual orientation.
80. Glazer, supra note 56, at 1033.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1033–34.
84. Specifically, Judge Walker asked the parties to address: “What are the consti-
tutional consequences if the evidence shows that sexual orientation is immutable for men
but not for women? Must gay men and lesbians be treated identically under the Equal
Protection Clause?” Questions for Closing Arguments, Docket No. C 09-2292 VRW, Docu-
ment 677, at 10 (June 8, 2010). This question also ignores the existence of bisexuality, but
this is arguably understandable given the lack of bisexual plaintiffs in the case.
85. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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the United States now make their own choices about who they will
marry, and, for them, marriage tends to be about individual bonds
rather than categories of people.86 Thus, if a man asked his white,
brown-haired girlfriend to marry him and she refused, it is not as
though a concerned friend would just suggest another brown-haired
white woman as a potential stand-in and then expect the second
woman’s consent to solve the problem. Individuals are not fungible.
Yet, it seems quite ordinary to require lesbian and gay plaintiffs to
prove the consistency and exclusivity of their attractions over time,
rather than just having to prove their bonds with particular persons.
The temptation to require such proof may arise from the Supreme
Court’s largely historical focus on immutability and the mispercep-
tion of bisexuality as mutable.87 However, while courts were previously
often reluctant to accept the argument that homosexuality (much
less bisexuality) was immutable,88 the immutability requirement has
been both declining in importance over time and gradually changing
in substance—in many cases where it continues to be applied—to more
clearly encompass sexual orientation and identity.89 Under this new
approach, immutability has been expanded to include “traits that are
so central to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for gov-
ernment to penalize a person for refusing to change them, regardless
86. See, e.g., Pamela C. Regan et al., Relationship Outcomes in Indian-American Love-
Based & Arranged Marriages, 110 PSYCHOL. REPORTS 915, 915–16 (2012) (describing
marriage by choice as being the “norm” in, and “typical[ ]” of, Western countries like the
United States and noting that persons who enter such marriages emphasize “feelings
of mutual compatibility and attraction between the partners”). The idea that marriage
focuses on individual bonds between the parties rather than categories of people is also
illustrated by Mr. Loving’s statement, through his attorney, to the Supreme Court justices
during oral argument: “[t]ell the Court I love my wife, and it is just unfair that I can’t
live with her in Virginia.” Robert A. Pratt, The Case of Mr. and Mrs. Loving: Reflections
on the Fortieth Anniversary of Loving v. Virginia, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 18–19 (2008).
87. See, e.g., Boucai, supra note 9, at 468–72.
88. See Susan R. Schmeiser, Changing the Immutable, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1495, 1512
(2009). The question of whether sexual orientation is immutable as that term was tradi-
tionally understood is closely tied to the question of whether it is genetically determined
or whether it develops as a result of life experience. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical
Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 63
(1996). Some social scientists are now coming to understand sexual orientation and iden-
tity as resulting from a combination of the two. DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 22.
89. Boucai, supra note 9, at 471–72; Nancy Levit, Theorizing & Litigating the Rights
of Sexual Minorities, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 21, 58–61 (2010); M.K.B. Darmer &
Tiffany Chang, Moving Beyond the “Immutability Debate” in the Fight for Equality After
Proposition 8, 12 SCHOLAR 1, 27–33 (2009); Schmeiser, supra note 88, at 1512–19.
Requiring immutability as traditionally understood is also problematic from a policy stand-
point. In addition to excluding groups that warrant protections, Janet Halley has pointed
out that the immutability requirement “is springloaded to harm racial minorities,” even
though race is considered the paradigmatic immutable trait, because of “its hidden as-
sumption that racial discrimination would be morally acceptable if blacks could change
the color of their skin . . . .” Halley, supra note 75, at 66.
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of how easy that change might be physically.” 90
Additionally, while it may be confusing to some people to think of
attraction to both different-sex and same-sex partners as immuta-
ble, in fact bisexual orientation is immutable in that it is no more
subject to individual control than is any other orientation.91 Bisexu-
als are not superheroes who can control their attractions to others
at will while everyone else is left at the mercy of the twists and turns
of their hearts. Thus, it would make no more sense to deny a bisex-
ual woman’s claimed right to marry her same-sex partner because
it is technically possible that she might, at some point in her life, fall
in love with a man than it would have made to deny Mr. Loving’s
claimed right to marry Miss Jeter because it was conceivable that
he might have someday fallen in love with a white woman.
Finally, it must be remembered that to impose a requirement on
LGBT rights plaintiffs that they show consistent, exclusive attrac-
tion to their own sex over time in order to recover undermines the
legitimacy of bisexuality and logically implies that bisexuals should
be entitled to fewer rights than lesbians and gays (who, the subtext
goes, are entitled to the same rights as heterosexuals because of
their similarity to them).
As described above, then, the electronically available employ-
ment discrimination case law in the United States reflects a dearth
of cases brought by bisexual plaintiffs.92 Similarly troubling is the
fact that, so far, bisexuals have ultimately won none of those cases
on the merits, although we came across a British case in which a bisex-
ual plaintiff had won a workplace harassment case and the First Cir-
cuit recently reinstated a bisexual plaintiff’s state law employment
discrimination claim.93 This evidence suggests that bisexuals may
90. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (1989) (Norris, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Boucai, supra note 9, at 471–72 (describing other courts’ adoption of this approach).
91. See Boucai, supra note 9, at 472; cf. DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 11 (noting with re-
spect to the related but distinct issue of fluidity of sexual identity among many women
over time that, “[e]ven when women undergo significant shifts in their patterns of erotic
response [over time], they typically report that such changes are unexpected and beyond
their control. . . . This finding is consistent with the extensive evidence . . . showing that
efforts to change sexual orientation through ‘reparative therapy’ simply do not work.”).
92. It is conceivable that more bisexual plaintiffs are involved in the cases than ap-
pears because some plaintiffs may have sued as gays or lesbians for strategic reasons
or because some of the small handful of plaintiffs whose sexual orientation was not ap-
parent in the order or opinion may in fact be bisexual. However, if the former possibility
is true, it suggests that bisexuals cannot come out in their own cases alleging discrimina-
tion based on bisexuality. This would be a very troubling instance of bisexual erasure.
Another possibility is that plaintiffs were assumed to be gay or lesbian based on current
relationship status. Given the requirement of showing suspect class membership to prove
discrimination, however, it seems unlikely that a plaintiff would fail to state her actual
orientation in a pleading unless there was some strategic reason for reframing it.
93. Harassment of Bisexual Employee, supra note 52; Flood v. Bank of America, No.
14-0168 (1st Cir. Feb. 27, 2015).
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have difficulty accessing justice and may be unable, in many cir-
cumstances, to obtain quality representation (Rowland and Apilado
being among the notable exceptions).
Relatedly, the larger context of cases addressing LGBT rights
demonstrates that judges obfuscate bisexuality even in cases like
Romer in which the laws at issue explicitly discriminate against bi-
sexuals. And in cases such as Apilado where bisexual plaintiffs sue
on the basis of sexual orientation discrimination, judges may not fully
understand what bisexuality is and how discrimination against
bisexuals occurs. Finally, the strategies highly skilled attorneys use
in the course of advocating for lesbian and gay clients also may dimin-
ish the legitimacy of bisexuality. We see this in Roberta Kaplan’s
references to gay and straight marriages and in her arguments about
lack of sexual fluidity in Windsor, as well as in Ted Olson’s examina-
tion of his client, Sandy Stier, in Perry.
All of this information provides evidence of discrimination against
bisexuals, but, with the exception of the facts in Apilado and Flood
(the First Circuit case), the information does not tell us about the
actual experiences of bisexuals. Instead, through courtroom tactics,
judicial voice, and perhaps the decisions of individual lawyers to
refuse representation, the lives of bisexuals are erased from, not only
the legal record, but also the jurisprudential imagination.
We set out to answer the question of what discrimination bisexu-
als experience through our survey, particularly in the employment
discrimination context, and found that a surprising number of respon-
dents (slightly over 50 percent) reported having experienced employ-
ment discrimination, broadly defined, at some point in their lives.
II. WHAT DISCRIMINATION DO BISEXUALS
FACE IN THE WORKPLACE?
A. Literature Review
Based on a review of existing literature on employment dis-
crimination against LGBT people, our study appears to be the first
descriptive, quantitative study designed to specifically measure the
subjective experiences of bisexuals with employment discrimination,
broadly defined.94 Most other available studies of employment dis-
crimination against LGBT people take one of three approaches: (1) not
including bisexuals; (2) combining data for bisexual women with data
94. Heidi Bruins Green et al. asked additional employment discrimination questions
of their bisexual respondents, which are not included in their Journal of Bisexuality piece
but which may be addressed in a later piece. See Bruins Green et al., supra note 39; E-mail
from Heidi Bruins Green to author (Oct. 11, 2011 at 6:05 P.M.) (including attachment
of survey questions) (on file with author).
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for lesbians or combining data for bisexual men with data for gay
men or; (3) combining all data regarding LGBT people together.95 We
found two other studies that separately measure employment discrimi-
nation against bisexuals, both of which also address discrimination
against gays and lesbians: Gregory M. Herek’s 2008 article Hate
Crimes and Stigma-Related Experiences Among Sexual Minority
Adults in the United States: Prevalence Estimates From a National
Probability Sample and Pew Research Center’s A Survey of LGBT
Americans: Attitudes, Experiences and Values in Changing Times.96
However, both defined employment discrimination in a significantly
more narrow way than we did. For instance, Herek limited the ques-
tion to instances where a person was fired, denied a job, or denied a
promotion, whereas, as further explained below, we defined discrim-
ination broadly to include harassment, unequal benefits, and other
types of unequal treatment.97 While Pew Research Center’s single
question on subjective experiences with employment discrimination
was somewhat broader than Herek’s, Pew Research Center simi-
larly focused on limited types of employment discrimination. Pew’s
Survey asked, “For each of the following, please indicate whether or
not it has happened to you because you are, or were perceived to be
[gay, lesbian, or bisexual]. . . . Been treated unfairly by an employer in
hiring, pay, or promotion.” 98 Again, our definitions were substan-
tially broader, as our entire study was focused on workplace discrim-
ination and we wanted to find out as much as possible about bisexuals’
experiences in the workplace, given the little that is known.
Both Herek’s and Pew Research Center’s findings indicate that bi-
sexuals are less likely to experience employment discrimination than
gays and lesbians. Herek found that roughly 16% of gay men and les-
bians reported having experienced such discrimination compared to
3.7% of bisexual men and 6.8 % of bisexual women.99 Herek, however,
did not attribute the lower rates of employment discrimination re-
ported by bisexuals to lower rates of societal stigma against them.
Rather, having previously found that heterosexuals express higher
95. S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N LGBT ADVISORY COMM., supra note 1, at 3; see also
James M. Croteau, Research on the Work Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual
People: An Integrative Review of Methodology and Findings, 48 J. OF VOCATIONAL BEHAV-
IOR 195, 196–98 (1996); Michele J. Eliason et al., Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender,
and Queer/Questioning Nurses’ Experiences in the Workplace, 27 J. OF PROF’L NURSING
237, 239 (2011).
96. Gregory M. Herek, Hate Crimes and Stigma-Related Experiences Among Sexual
Minority Adults in the United States: Prevalence Estimates From a National Probability
Sample, 24 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 54 (Jan. 2008) [hereinafter Herek, Hate
Crimes]; PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 31.
97. Herek, Hate Crimes, supra note 96, at 59.
98. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 31, at 148–49.
99. Herek, Hate Crimes, supra note 96, at 61.
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rates of stigma towards bisexuals than towards lesbians and gays,
Herek attributed bisexuals’ lower rates of employment discrimina-
tion to their comparative lack of visibility in the workplace.100
Pew Research Center’s very recent report, also based on a nation-
ally representative probability sample, similarly indicated that bisexu-
als reported lower rates of employment discrimination than did gay
men and lesbians.101 However, Pew Research Center’s study indi-
cated higher rates of such discrimination for all LGB groups and
further showed a higher proportion of bisexuals reporting discrimina-
tion vis a vis lesbian and gay respondents: 15% of bisexuals com-
pared to 23% of lesbians and 26% of gay men.102
The relative lowness of rates of employment discrimination
against LGB people reported in both the Herek and Pew Research
Center studies may be due to the somewhat narrow phrasing of the
single question each asked on the subject. The rates of discrimination
against LGB people in both studies appear to fall on the low side
when compared to other studies. For instance, in a review of exist-
ing studies, James M. Croteau reported that LGB workers experi-
ence pervasive workplace discrimination, with reported rates from
different studies ranging from 25% to 66%,103 although more recent
studies tend to report somewhat lower rates.104
Another important recent study, which specifically focused on
bisexuals in the employment context, was conducted by Heidi Bruins
Green, Nicholas R. Payne, and Jamison Green.105 Bruins Green and
her colleagues sought to measure bisexuals’ satisfaction with their
workplace environments, as well as other factors, such as their levels
of outness at work, their perceptions of co-workers’ attitudes towards
bisexuals, and the prevalence, effect, and content of employment
non-discrimination policies at bisexuals’ places of employment.106
100. Id. at 69. In fact, Herek found in the earlier study that heterosexuals rated bisexual
men and women lower than any of the other fourteen named political, racial, ethnic, and
religious groups—except for injecting drug users. Herek, Heterosexuals, supra note 39,
at 268. Pew Research Center’s study corroborates bisexuals’ lack of visibility in the work-
place. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 31, at 44.
101. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 31, at 42, 113.
102. Id. at 42.
103. Croteau, supra note 95, at 198. A similarly high level of discrimination (60%) was
reported by college and university student affairs professionals in a more recent study
by Croteau. James M. Croteau & Julianne S. Lark, On Being Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual
in Student Affairs: A National Survey of Experiences on the Job, 46 NASPA J. 382, 390
(2009).
104. M.V. LEE BADGETT ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., BIAS IN THE WORKPLACE: CONSIS-
TENT EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION 3 (June
2007) (stating that fifteen recent studies report employment discrimination rates against
LGB people ranging from 15% to 43%). But see Croteau & Lark, supra note 103, at 390.
105. Bruins Green et al., supra note 39.
106. Id.
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The authors did not report data on bisexuals’ experiences with em-
ployment discrimination, however.
The studies described above were the most relevant to our project.
Other studies examine discrimination against LGBT workers in spe-
cific industries107 or focus on specific types of discrimination against
LGBT workers.108 A small number of studies examine the specific ex-
periences of bisexual workers, but in a somewhat narrower context
than our study,109 and one British publication provides practical advice
for employers on supporting bisexual workers based on interviews
and focus groups.110
B. Methodology and Results of the Current Survey
1. Methodology
We reviewed other employment discrimination surveys and
adapted our questions from those surveys. We also followed the Wil-
liams Institute’s Best Practices for Asking About Sexual Orientation
on Surveys with minor modifications.111 Most of our questions regard-
ing the types of employment discrimination experienced were adapted
to the context of sexual orientation discrimination from Richard
Roessler et al.’s The Employment Discrimination Experiences of Adults
with Multiple Sclerosis, which contained the most comprehensive
107. See, e.g., Eliason et al., supra note 95 (LGBT and Queer/questioning nurses);
Croteau & Lark, supra note 103 (college and university student affairs professionals who
identify as LGB); Jeff Frank, Gay Glass Ceilings, 73 ECONOMICA 485, 485 (2006) (analyzing
salaries and ranks of LGB non-academic and academic university staff in the United
Kingdom).
108. See, e.g., John M. Blandford, The Nexus of Sexual Orientation and Gender in the
Determination of Earnings, 56 INDUS. & LAB. RELATIONS REV. 622, 622 (2003) (analyzing
effects of sexual orientation and gender on earnings); M.V. Lee Badgett, The Wage Effects
of Sexual Orientation, 48 INDUS. & LAB. RELATIONS REV. 726, 726 (1995) (same).
109. See, e.g., Thomas Köllen, Bisexuality and Diversity Management—Addressing the
B in LGBT as a Relevant ‘Sexual Orientation’ in the Workplace, 13 J. OF BISEXUALITY 122,
131 (2013) (assessing the effectiveness of diversity management techniques in German
companies in improving the workplace climate for bisexuals); TUC, FOCUSING ON BI-
SEXUAL TRADE UNIONISTS: THE RESULTS OF A TUC SURVEY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CHANGE 6 (2010), http://union.org.nz/sites/union/files/2010%20TUC%20Survey%20of
%20Bisexual%20Unionists.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5NBA-RY9C (presenting re-
sults of a survey of bisexual members of trade unions and describing the invisibility ex-
perienced by some respondents and the continued existence of inaccurate stereotypes
of bisexuality).
110. Chamberlain, supra note 23 (providing advice for employers on providing support
for bisexual workers based on interviews and focus groups).
111. WILLIAMS INST., SEXUAL MINORITY ASSESSMENT RESEARCH TEAM, BEST PRACTICES
FOR ASKING ABOUT SEXUAL ORIENTATION ON SURVEYS (2009), http://williamsinstitute.law
.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/SMART-FINAL-Nov-2009.pdf, archived at http://perma
.cc/73KY-GKR9.
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set of questions examining employment discrimination that we could
find.112 We asked about diverse types of employment discrimination
and also utilized a frequency scale for each answer ranging from
“Never” to “Regularly.” Using a range of questions about employment
discrimination, rather than a single-term measure, is recommended
by other researchers such as Croteau.113 We validated the survey by
distributing it to colleagues in the social sciences for review, and we
modified some questions in response to their recommendations.
After Hamline University’s Institutional Review Board approved
the project in June 2012 and after we had conducted our validation,
we distributed the online survey beginning in late July 2012 by con-
tacting LGBT and bisexual organizations and listervs nationwide
via e-mail and asking the organizations and listerv owners to dis-
tribute the survey. We also posted the survey ourselves on listservs
to which we belonged and made some use of Facebook to distribute the
survey. Although we did not attempt to track rates of responses from
each group we contacted, several staff members and listserv owners
responded and either expressed willingness to distribute the survey or
described the efforts they had undertaken to do so. We also contacted
friends and colleagues in our disciplines and asked them to consider
taking the survey and to distribute it to others who may be inter-
ested (snowball distribution). Listserv participants and colleagues
in other countries also offered to help distribute the survey interna-
tionally, and we made a few attempts ourselves to reach out to
LGBT groups in other English-speaking countries such as Canada
and Ireland.
After it became clear that our initial respondents were predom-
inantly white, with only small percentages of African-American and
Native American respondents and a very small percentage of Latino/a
respondents, we identified additional LGBT groups of color to reach
out to and also contacted professional organizations such as the Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools Section on Minority Groups. How-
ever, although these efforts had some positive impact, they ultimately
did not make a substantial difference.
In response to comments received by survey respondents during
the course of the survey, we made changes to two questions regarding
respondents’ current employment to allow respondents to specify
that they either were not currently employed or that the question did
not apply to them. These changes did not affect the core of our results,
112. Richard Roessler et al., The Employment Discrimination Experiences of Adults
with Multiple Sclerosis, 77 J. OF REHABILITATION 20, 23 (Table 1) (2011).
113. Croteau, supra note 95, at 204.
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which address prior experiences with employment discrimination,
rather than current workplace dynamics.
2. Results
a. General Respondent Demographics
A total of 190 respondents completed the survey or some portion
of it. One hundred and seventeen of them currently identified as bisex-
ual, including those who chose “Other” and wrote in an answer that
included “bisexual” such as “Queer/bisexual” or “bisexual/pansexual.”
Also included in that 117 is a respondent who wrote in “bi-leaning,
married monogamously to a cisgendered member of the opposite gen-
der” because we were focused on bisexual self-identification rather
than strictly on bisexual behavior. Broadening the sexual identity
category to include both bisexuals and others with fluid identities,
such as those who wrote in “pansexual” or similar terms in the “Other”
category, increased the number of relevant respondents to 125.114
Only 10.1% of the respondents identified as gay or lesbian and 3.0%
identified as straight or heterosexual.115
Of the total respondents, 64.5% were female, 28.4% were male,
and 7.4% identified themselves as “Other.”116 We also asked if re-
spondents identified as transgender, and 6.5% of the total respondents
indicated that they did. In terms of race, we allowed respondents to
check multiple boxes. Of the total respondents, 91% identified as
White, 3.6% as Black or African American, 1.2% as Asian or Asian-
American, 0.6% as Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, 3.6% as
American Indian or Alaska Native, and 6.6% as Other. Some of those
who marked “Other” for race wrote in answers such as “Black British,”
“mixed” or “South Asian.” Additionally, 1.8% of respondents reported
that they were Hispanic or Latino/a. Seventy-eight percent of the total
respondents were from the United States, 10% were from the United
Kingdom, and 5.8% were from Australia. Other countries represented
included Germany, the Netherlands, and Canada. Four people did not
complete the survey.117
114. We did not include those who wrote in “Queer” by itself in the “Other” category as
fluid-identified because queer can mean so many different things. See, e.g., A Definition
of “Queer,” PFLAG, http://community.pflag.org/page.aspx?pid=952 (last visited Feb. 28,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/A5W7-AEGZ.
115. These percentages include only those who checked “gay or lesbian’ or ‘straight or
heterosexual.’ ” No respondents who checked “Other” are included in these percentages.
116. The most common answer specified in this category was “intersex.”
117. Only a few of our questions, such as the initial long question on how frequently if
ever a respondent experienced any of the numerous types of discrimination listed, were
required to be answered. Thus, the four people who did not complete the survey did not
address all of the required questions.
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Notably, the percentages of discrimination faced by international
respondents of all orientations were generally similar to the overall
percentage of discrimination experienced by U.S. respondents of all
orientations, with the exception of Germany, where our one respon-
dent did not report discrimination. The percentages of international
respondents facing discrimination ranged from 47% in the United
Kingdom to 64% in Australia. The overall percentage of United States
respondents who reported discrimination was 59%.
The most commonly represented U.S. states were California (20
respondents), Washington (19 respondents), Minnesota (16 respon-
dents), New York (15 respondents), and Massachusetts (8 respon-
dents). As appears to be typical of respondents to surveys on sexual
orientation discrimination,118 our respondents were highly educated,
with all of them having completed at least some college and 39.3%
having completed graduate or professional school. In terms of age,
75.3% of respondents were 45 or under, with the largest percentage,
16.6%, being in the 31–35 category.
Of the bisexual respondents specifically, 90.4% identified as
White, 4.3% as American Indian or Alaska Native, 3.5% as Black or
African American, and 7.0% as Other, with four people in the Other
category specifying designations that indicated that they were persons
of color, such as “mixed,” “mulatto/a,” “Black British,” or “South Asian.”
One person, or 0.9%, identified as Native Hawaiian or other Pacific
Islander and two people (1.7%) identified as Asian or Asian-American.
Additionally, one person (0.9%) reported identifying as Hispanic or
Latino/a. In all, we had 16 bisexual-identified respondents who were
persons of color.119 In terms of sex of the bisexual respondents, 64.1%
of them described themselves as female, 33.3% as male, and 2.6% as
Other. Additionally, 3.4% identified themselves as transgender. The
age and education breakdowns were similar for bisexuals as for re-
spondents as a whole.
b. Discrimination-Related Demographics and Timing
Slightly over half of bisexual-identified respondents (51.7%) re-
ported having experienced employment discrimination at some point
in their lives. Examining the responses of all those with fluid identities
resulted in a slightly higher level of discrimination (53.2%). Bisexual-
identified respondents of color reported a significantly higher rate
of discrimination based on sexual orientation—68.8% or 11 out of
118. Croteau, supra note 95, at 201.
119. This number includes the Hispanic/Latino/a respondent. Moreover, all of the re-
spondents of color who reported having experienced discrimination stated that it had
occurred in the United States or in the United Kingdom.
2015] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST BISEXUALS 725
16. The initial question inquired about the frequency of respondents’
experiences, if any, with nearly forty types of employment discrimina-
tion (see Table 1). After this initial, broad-based question, many of the
remaining questions were directed at respondents’ most recent ex-
perience of discrimination.
It is important to note that, because our list of types of discrimina-
tion was very broad, not all of the respondents’ negative employment
experiences that were based on their sexual orientations, if proven,
would be actionable in and of themselves. Taking harassment as an ex-
ample, state law, like federal law, tends to require that harassment
based on membership in a protected class be severe or pervasive to
be actionable (unless the harassment has resulted in a tangible em-
ployment action).120 Thus, a person who had experienced only one
homophobic slur at work would not likely be able to sue for sexual
orientation discrimination under state law. However, respondents
could not reasonably be expected to be able to accurately estimate
whether any harassment they faced would be considered severe or
pervasive as a legal matter or to generally evaluate the viability of
their potential legal cases, so we decided to err on the side of collecting
information about experiences that were probative of discrimination
even if each experience on its own would not necessarily qualify as
actionable discrimination.121
Notably, limiting the focus to more traditional types of discrimina-
tory actions such as firing and failure to hire also reveals that a signif-
icant—although much smaller—portion of our respondents believed
they had been subject to those types of discrimination. For example,
12.8% (n=15) of bisexual-identified respondents believed that they
had not been hired due to their sexual orientation, and 7.7% (n=9) of
them reported that they had been fired or terminated based on sex-
ual orientation.
In terms of when the most recent experience occurred, the most
common answer was between one and five years ago (37.1% of bisexual
identified respondents and 35.3% of all fluid-identified respondents).
Alarmingly, 21.0% of bisexuals and 25.0% of all those with fluid identi-
ties had experienced an instance of employment discrimination within
120. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (discuss-
ing the severe or pervasive requirement under Title VII); BARBARA T. LINDERMANN &
PAUL GROSSMAN, I EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1304 (4th ed. 2007) (same); Carol
Schultz Vento, When is Work Environment Intimidating, Hostile or Offensive, so as to
Constitute Sexual Harassment Under State Law, 93 A.L.R.5th 47, §§ 5, 13 (2001) (sum-
marizing cases that apply the severe or pervasive requirement under state law in the con-
text of sexual harassment).
121. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (acknowledging
in a case about a company’s failure to promote an employee based on her sex that “stereo-
typed remarks” do not “inevitably prove” discrimination but stating that such remarks
can be evidence of discrimination).
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the last six months. However, a composite of roughly 35% reported
that the most recent incident was either five to ten years ago or more
than ten years ago (35.5% of bisexuals and 33.8% of all those with
fluid identities).
We asked what relationships respondents were in at the time of
the most recent experience of employment discrimination as well as
how they identified at work at that time. Slightly more bisexual-identi-
fied respondents were in a different-sex monogamous relationship
(19.4%) than in a same-sex monogamous relationship (14.5%). Roughly
a third of the bisexual respondents were in a polyamorous or non-
monogamous relationship (33.9%) and roughly a third (32.3%) were
not in a relationship at the time. The percentage breakdown for rela-
tionships was very similar for the group of all respondents with fluid
identities. For the respondents in polyamorous or non-monogamous
relationships at the time of the most recent incident, most reported
that their partners were some combination of persons of the same
sex, those of a different sex, and/or transgender or intersex persons
(71.4% of bisexual respondents and 73.9% of all fluid respondents).
The remainder of respondents in polyamorous or non-monogamous
relationships were partnered with persons of a different sex.122
We asked about how respondents self-identified at work at the
time of the most recent incident both because some respondents may
have been closeted and because people’s identities may change over
time, a phenomenon that is quite common for women especially.123 The
122. Because relationships with different-sex or same-sex persons often serve as a proxy
for others in assessing a person’s sexual orientation, thus increasing the invisibility of
bisexuals and other fluid-identified persons, see, e.g., Chamberlain, supra note 23, at 12;
TUC, supra note 109, at 3, it was somewhat surprising to see that a substantial percentage
of bisexual and other fluid respondents reported experiencing discrimination while solely
in different-sex relationships. We assume that respondents’ self-identification as bisexual
or fluid, in some cases, and the knowledge or perception that they were other than hetero-
sexual, in others, was more salient to those engaging in the discrimination than the make-
up of their relationships at the time. This was certainly the case with the respondent who
volunteered to be interviewed. She disclosed her bisexuality and polyamorous identity to
her employer and then was fired, despite being in an different-sex marriage at the time
and not being involved in any polyamorous activity. See infra note 128 and associated text.
The fact that about a third of our respondents were in nonmonogamous or polyamorous
relationships at the time of the most recent incident of discrimination accords with
research suggesting that bisexuals as a whole may be more open to nonmonogamy than
straight or gay people. See, e.g., Zhana Vrangalova Ph.D, Are Bisexuals Really Less Monog-
amous Than Everyone Else? When it comes to commitment, does sexual orientation make
a difference?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept. 27, 2014), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog
/strictly-casual/201409/are-bisexuals-really-less-monogamous-everyone-else, archived at
https://perma.cc/84RG-ZRFL; Tweedy, supra note 43, at 1480 n.77 (citing Geri Weitzman,
Therapy with Clients Who Are Bisexual and Polyamorous, in AFFIRMATIVE PSYCHO-
THERAPY WITH BISEXUAL WOMEN AND BISEXUAL MEN 137, 141 (Ronald C. Fox ed., 2006)).
123. See Tweedy, supra note 43, at 1471 n.34 (citing DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 82–85,
87).
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majority of both bisexual-identified respondents and all those with
fluid identities self-identified as bisexual at that time (61.3% of bisexu-
als and 55.9% of all fluid-identified respondents). Slightly over a
fifth (22.6% of bisexuals and 20.6% of fluid-identified respondents)
reported that they did not self-identify and were presumed hetero-
sexual. Several respondents (12.9% of bisexuals and 20.6% of fluid-
identified respondents) picked Other. Among bisexual-identified
respondents who chose “Other,” several explained that, although they
did not self-identify at work, they were known not to be straight by
at least some people at their workplaces. Additional responses from
the group of all fluid respondents included “Genderqueer pansexual,”
“panoramic asexual,” and “Queer/fluid/lesbian.”
In the majority of cases, the most recent incident of employment
discrimination experienced by bisexual-identified respondents and
all fluid respondents occurred in an urban setting (59.7% for bisex-
ual identified respondents and 58.8% of all fluid respondents).
Similarly, most of these respondents reported that the most recent
incident occurred in the private sector (58.1% of bisexual-identified
respondents and 58.8% of all fluid respondents) with a roughly equal
split in the remainder between public sector and non-profits. For a
majority of respondents who had experienced workplace discrimina-
tion, the most recent instance had occurred in a workplace with over
one hundred employees (60.7% of bisexuals and 58.2% of all fluid-
identified respondents). The largest portion of these respondents
(32.8% of bisexuals and 29.9% of all fluid-identified respondents) had
experienced the most recent incident while working for an employer
with over one thousand workers.
c. Types of Discrimination Experienced
We asked respondents “how frequently, if ever,” they believed they
had experienced “any of the following forms of discrimination due to
[their] (perceived/presumed) sexual orientation in any work environ-
ment.” By far the most common type of discrimination experienced by
bisexuals and all those with fluid identities was “inappropriate jokes
or insults in work or break settings,” with 58.1% of bisexual-identified
respondents and 59.2% of all fluid respondents reporting having ex-
perienced this type of discrimination at least once and almost 10% of
each group reporting that it happens regularly (9.4% of bisexuals and
9.6% of all fluid respondents).124 Other quite common types of sexual
124. This percentage was higher than the total who noted, in response to the next ques-
tion, that they had experienced some type of employment discrimination. A possible expla-
nation for this is that some respondents did not believe experiencing jokes or insults
rises to the level of discrimination.
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orientation discrimination included verbal sexual harassment (30.8%
of bisexuals and 31.2% of all fluid-identified respondents reported
having experienced this at least once); unfair access to fringe benefits
(27.4% of bisexuals and 29% of fluid-identified respondents had ex-
perienced this);125 verbal harassment based on gender expression
(25.6% of bisexuals and the same proportion of all fluid-identified re-
spondents); verbal harassment based on sexual identity (24.8% of
bisexuals and 25.6% of fluid-identified respondents); and threats or
verbal abuse in work or break settings (20.5% of bisexual respondents
and 19.2% of fluid-identified respondents). Additionally, over 15% of
bisexual and fluid respondents reported having experienced the follow-
ing four types of discrimination at least once: receiving excessive su-
pervision or oversight on the job (18.8% of bisexuals and 20.0% of
fluid-identified); different or harsher standards of performance (19.8%
of bisexuals and 22.6% of fluid-identified); discriminatory questions or
comments during the job interview (21.4% of bisexuals and 21.6% of
fluid-identified); and inappropriate questions or statements on the job
application (15.5% of bisexuals and 20.2% of fluid identified). Having
received excessive or inappropriate discipline was somewhat more
common for fluid-identified respondents as a whole (17.6%) than for
bisexuals (14.5%). A chart showing the main question on discrimina-
tion and the answers of bisexual respondents only is provided in
Table 1.126
TABLE 1. TYPES OF DISCRIMINATION EXPERIENCED BY
BISEXUAL RESPONDENTS
Indicate by marking the bubbles in the corresponding column how
frequently, if ever, you believe you have experienced any of the fol-
lowing forms of discrimination due to your (perceived/presumed)
sexual orientation in any work environment:








comments during the job inter-
view (e.g., questions explicitly
or implicitly asking about
sexual orientation) 92 13 6 4 2
117
125. The example listed in the survey for this question was a lack of domestic part-
nership benefits.
126. In the actual survey, many of the types of discrimination listed had examples next
to them, but those examples are not shown in Table 1.
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statements on the job
application 98 4 8 4 2
116
Unfair use of written or oral
tests for employment screening
purposes 106 4 5 2 0
117
Failure or refusal to hire due to
sexual orientation 102 6 2 6 1
117
Employer purportedly sought
sexual minority applicants as
part of a diversity initiative but
nonetheless discriminated
against them 104 5 1 6 0
116
Restricted access to advertised
employment opportunities 107 3 2 3 0
115
Restriction to a certain type
of job 106 3 3 2 1
115
Assignment to inappropriate job
tasks or duties 106 4 2 2 1
115
Different or harsher standards
of performance 93 6 8 5 4
116
Excessive or inappropriate
discipline 100 6 1 7 3
117
Unfair compensation or wages
102 6 4 4 0
116
Unfair access to fringe benefits
85 9 7 9 7
117
Unfair access to maternity
leave or other unfair treatment
in the context of pregnancy or
parenthood as a result of
sexual orientation 106 4 1 2 3
116
Denial of seniority rights and
privileges 104 5 2 4 1
116
Denial of pension or other
retirement benefits 112 2 1 0 1
116
Lack of support from a labor
organization 108 4 0 3 1
116
Limited access to job-related
training or continuing
education 108 4 1 0 2
115
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Restricted access to general use
areas, restrooms, and/or
recreational areas 113 0 1 2 0
116
Unfair rules related to working
conditions, job environment, or
employment privileges 106 6 4 0 1
117
Receiving excessive supervision
or oversight on the job 95 7 7 6 2
117
Inappropriate jokes or insults
in work or break settings 49 11 28 18 11
117
Threats or verbal abuse in
work or break settings 93 12 8 4 0
117
Physical intimidation or abuse
in work or break settings 106 3 4 3 1
117
Physical sexual harassment
101 6 3 7 0
117
Verbal sexual harassment
81 10 11 12 3
117
Physical harassment based on
gender expression 112 2 0 3 0
117
Verbal harassment based on
gender expression 87 7 9 13 1
117
Physical harassment based on
sexual identity 106 6 2 3 0
117
Verbal harassment based on
sexual identity 88 7 11 10 1
117
Denial or delay of promotion
102 4 4 6 1
117
Unfair demotion 107 5 1 4 0 117
Unfair suspension
113 4 0 0 0
117
Forced retirement
116 1 0 0 0
117
Unfair layoff practices
107 5 1 0 2
115
Firing or termination related to
sexual orientation 107 7 1 0 1
116
Failure of employer to reinstate
employment 111 5 1 0 0
117
Denial of severance pay
113 3 0 1 0
117
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provided by employer or




We also asked respondents two related open-ended questions:
first, to describe the most recent incident of discrimination and then
to describe their most detrimental experience with workplace discrimi-
nation. Some themes emerged in the responses to these questions.
Several respondents recounted having been fired or forced to leave
their workplaces due to their bisexuality. One person reported having
to move to find work and alluded to health problems that had devel-
oped as a result of the discrimination.
Another important theme was hypersexualization. Two female
respondents reported that co-workers or supervisors viewed them as
sexually available after learning of their bisexuality and then pro-
ceeded to make verbal or physical advances. A third female respon-
dent, who identified herself as being Native American as well as
White, was asked by a co-worker in a law firm about her interest in
threesomes and public sex after he learned about her bisexuality from
the Internet. The co-worker then proceeded to extort help with his
work from her based on threats that he would tell their supervisors of
her sexual orientation. A fourth female respondent recounted being
told frequent jokes about threesomes based on her bisexuality in her
job in student affairs at a university. One male respondent of Native
American heritage also reported hypersexualization, explaining that
his manager laughed when a co-worker made jokes about the supposed
looseness of his anus.
A third theme was discrimination by gays and lesbians in the
workplace, usually in the form of biphobia.127 For example, two
respondents reported being told directly by gay or lesbian supervisors
that the supervisors disapproved of their bisexuality. One of these
two respondents also reported, in response to the question about her
most detrimental experience of discrimination, that an LGBT youth
organization had rejected her application for her “dream job” because
she “was not gay enough.” She further explained: “I ended up inter-
nalizing feelings of not being a ‘real queer’ or ‘queer enough’ person
and struggled with feeling alienated from the queer community in
my city for a long time. It’s taken me 10 years to get back involved.”
127. See, e.g., BARKER ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (defining biphobia).
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Similarly, a bisexual transgender man reported that, during an inter-
view for a position addressing HIV prevention for bi and gay men,
he was told that he “would not be perceived as ‘gay’ enough, or as a
‘real man’” and that the other interviewers failed to speak up or inter-
vene. This respondent perceived the remark to be both about his
sexuality and his gender fluidity. Two other respondents reported
having hurtful jokes about bisexuality directed at them by gay and
lesbian co-workers.
Another theme that emerged was discrimination by religious indi-
viduals or religiously affiliated organizations. Only three people re-
ported such discrimination, but, in at least two of the cases, it had
devastating effects on the respondents’ lives. In one case, a female
respondent contacted us after we distributed the survey and offered
to be interviewed.128 During the interview, she described an incident
that occurred shortly after she had moved across the country with
her husband and young child. She obtained a job working in the social
services division of a religiously affiliated non-profit. Not long after
starting the job, she began to have concerns about some of the organiza-
tion’s policies, and she decided to come out as bisexual and poly-
amorous via a letter to her two immediate supervisors. They were
then forced to fire her by those higher up in the organization. She filed
a complaint with a state agency and engaged in some activism to bring
attention to the organization’s discriminatory actions against her.
Apparently as a result, she had not been able to find work when we
talked to her, several months after the incident. She also had expe-
rienced stomach problems as a result of the experience and reported
being under extreme financial stress due to the difficulty of provid-
ing for her child. Her husband, who had a history of mental health
problems, experienced worsening mental health after the incident and
had to leave his part-time job. The couple almost divorced in response
to the stress caused by the firing and its aftermath.
In the second case, a woman who had been employed as a musi-
cian by a religiously affiliated band reported constant pressure to
alter her appearance to be more feminine as well as repeated ques-
tioning about whether she was a lesbian. She eventually was fired
and thereafter emigrated to Austria and then Germany in reaction
to the incident. She now works for herself in order to avoid any possi-
bility of discrimination.
Finally, although not overtly similar to incidents reported by other
respondents, four additional responses are of interest. One female
academic of Native American, White, and Jewish heritage reported
being denied tenure in part as a result of being outed by her own
128. This interview was separately approved by the Chair of Hamline’s Institutional
Review Board.
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sexuality-related research, and a male respondent noted that he would
lose his professional license (of unspecified type) in South Carolina if
his and his partner’s bisexuality were discovered because his orien-
tation would be considered evidence of “moral ineptitude.” Next, a
male respondent reported experiencing physical violence at his work-
place based on his sexual orientation—a supervisor would throw
things at him and call him a “faggot.” Lastly, one respondent who
stated that she had not been discriminated against commented spe-
cifically on the invisibility of bisexuality.
d. Remedies Sought
In hopes of finding out why so few bisexual employees appear
to pursue litigation in response to discrimination, we asked respon-
dents a series of questions relating to relief sought and barriers to
relief, if any, that respondents had encountered. As a preliminary note,
it is not possible to definitively determine whether any laws or rules
were in place that prohibited the sexual orientation discrimination
that our respondents reported. This is because we lack information
on the precise date of the discrimination in each case, and because,
at least in the United States, a confusing array of state, local, and,
in some cases, tribal laws govern (or fail to govern) this type of dis-
crimination. Furthermore, employer policies may prohibit the dis-
crimination even in the absence of a relevant law. Additionally, as
noted earlier, it is impossible to tell from the information we have
whether a given incident would be actionable under applicable law.
Nonetheless, we did ask three questions that provide some informa-
tion on this question. First, we asked respondents what country the
most recent incident of discrimination occurred in, and we then
asked United States respondents to identify the city and state. Of
the bisexual-identified respondents who answered this question and
who experienced the most recent incident in the United States,
71.7% of them experienced the incident in a jurisdiction that currently
has a statewide law in place prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation.129
We also asked whether there was an employer policy prohibit-
ing sexual orientation discrimination at the workplace where the most
recent incident occurred and whether there were laws in place “at any
level” at the time that protected against such discrimination. As to em-
ployer policies, 50% of bisexual identified respondents reported that
a policy prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination was in place,
129. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 46 (listing state laws). We omitted from
this count one respondent that listed the most recent incident as having occurred in three
states, two of which had protections in place.
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approximately 16% said that no such policy was in place, and about
34% said that they did not know. The breakdown for all fluid respon-
dents on employment policies was 48.5% had such policies, about
16% did not, and just over 35% of respondents did not know.130 As to
whether any laws were in place at the relevant time that protected
against sexual orientation discrimination, 56.5% of bisexual respon-
dents said yes, 17.7% of such respondents said no, and 25.8% of bisex-
ual respondents did not know. For all fluid-identified respondents, the
breakdown was 57.4% yes, 16.2% no, and 26.5% did not know. Thus,
it does appear that, in a majority of cases, there were laws or poli-
cies in place prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination, although
precise percentages are impossible to estimate.
Only a handful of respondents (six) reported having filed some
kind of complaint in response to the discrimination (9.7% of bisexual-
identified respondents and 8.8% of all fluid-identified respondents).131
Five of the six stated that the complaint was filed internally in the
company, and two of those five also filed a complaint in a state, local,
or tribal agency. The sixth respondent noted that a complaint was filed
in the “Department office,” which appears to mean that the complaint
was filed internally. Of the two people who filed complaints in agen-
cies, one case was still pending and the other had been resolved un-
favorably to the respondent. Three of the respondents had their
internal complaints resolved in a way that was favorable to them.
We asked the six respondents who had sought relief how fre-
quently they had faced barriers or obstacles. Reassuringly, three
people, or half, reported that they had never faced barriers or obsta-
cles. These three respondents had all filed internal complaints through
which the issue had been resolved favorably to them. The three other
respondents, two of whom had filed complaints in agencies, reported
that they faced barriers or obstacles “somewhat often.” Two of these
respondents had cases that were still pending, and the third had his
complaint filed in an agency resolved unfavorably to him. The respon-
dents who had faced barriers or obstacles described the barriers as
disbelief and downplaying of the situation, uncertainty about the
legality of the conduct that resulted in foot dragging, and denial of
charges by the employer followed by a provision of references that
were devoid of information.
130. It is possible that persons who identify as pansexual or omnisexual or who use
other terms for their sexual identities that are less widely recognized could have trouble
accessing protections under policies and laws that define sexual orientation using more
standardized terms.
131. A seventh person reported having filed a complaint but specified Facebook as the
place where it was filed. We omitted this response because the question was directed at
legal and administrative complaints.
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e. Decisions Not to Pursue Relief
In addition, we asked those who had experienced discrimination
but had not filed a complaint why they had not done so and provided
several reasons to choose among, as well as an open-ended “Other”
category. The most common response (except for “Other”) was “Did not
think I would get the assistance I needed” (45.5% of self-identified
bisexuals and 42.6% of all fluid-identified respondents). In the open-
ended responses, several respondents noted a fear of “rock[ing] the
boat” or creating drama for others in the workplace. Additionally, a
female respondent noted a fear of retaliation and an intersex person
noted an inability to afford gaining a reputation as a freelancer who
was difficult to work with. One respondent noted that the incident
had occurred in front of her boss, so she did not think she should have
to file a complaint. Several people reported that they did not file a
complaint because they viewed the incident as minor or because they
had dealt with the situation themselves.
3. Discussion
Our study revealed levels of subjective experiences with discrimi-
nation (51.7% of bisexuals or 53.2% of all fluid respondents) that are
similar to some other studies addressing the experiences of LGBT
respondents in general,132 but which are significantly higher than
rates reported for bisexuals in both Herek’s 2008 study and the Pew
Research Center’s 2013 report. There are likely several reasons for
this. As mentioned previously, our definitions of employment dis-
crimination were much broader than those reflected in the single
questions posed by Herek and Pew Research Center. Additionally, our
approach of contacting listservs and LGBT and bisexual organizations
probably resulted in our attracting respondents who were much more
likely to be out about their sexuality than bisexuals in general, which
in turn would make our respondents more likely to be targets of dis-
crimination. However, due to the difficulty of finding bisexual respon-
dents, this appears to be a common method of survey distribution
when attempting to study bisexuals.133
The study confirmed that bisexuals and others with fluid identi-
ties believe they experience a wide range of types of discrimination
based on sexual orientation, including many types of harassment as
132. See, e.g., Croteau, supra note 95, at 198; Croteau & Lark, supra note 103, at 390.
133. Ross et al., supra note 45, at 497, 501; Wendy Bostwick, Assessing Bisexual Stigma
& Mental Health Status: A Brief Report, 12 J. OF BISEXUALITY 214, 216 (2012); Herek, Hate
Crimes, supra note 96, at 70.
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well as the more traditional types of discrimination—firing and failure
to hire due to sexual orientation. These results corroborate existing
research demonstrating that bisexuals are subject to both homopho-
bia, largely from the mainstream culture, and biphobia, or oppression
specifically linked to fear of bisexuals, which is perpetrated both by
heterosexuals and lesbian and gay persons.134 For example, homopho-
bia was evident in the experiences of the respondent whose supervi-
sor threw things at him and called him “faggot,” while biphobia was
demonstrated in the experiences of respondents who were told they
were “not gay enough” to work for LGBT organizations. Because our
study was primarily quantitative, it is difficult to assess to what extent
respondents experienced homophobia versus biphobia, although our
open-ended questions provide some snapshots of the discrimination
that respondents experienced.
Some of the answers we received to open-ended questions about
discrimination are consistent with Stonewall U.K.’s qualitative re-
search indicating that bisexuals are subject to specific stereotypes,
such as the perception that they are untrustworthy or indecisive.135
For example, when one male respondent attended an LGBT confer-
ence, a co-worker told him “bisexuals can’t decide between choices.”
Several respondents to the survey also described being treated
as hypersexual by co-workers and supervisors. While this stereotype
was historically applied to gays and lesbians as well, and continues
to be so applied to some extent,136 it appears that it is particularly
prevalent with respect to bisexuality.137
The fact that such a high proportion of respondents had experi-
enced inappropriate jokes or insults based on their sexual orientations
may be evidence that bisexuality is not seen as a serious identity that
134. See Ross et al., supra note 45, at 501.
135. Chamberlain, supra note 23, at 6.
136. See, e.g., Gena Castro Rodriguez, LGBTQ Girls in the Juvenile Justice System—
Discrimination, Alienation and Marginalization, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 401,
436 (2011) (describing the hypersexualization of lesbian and bisexual girls by staff in the
juvenile justice system); Taylor Flynn, Of Communism, Treason, and Addiction: An Eval-
uation of Novel Challenges to the Military’s Anti-Gay Policy, 80 IOWA L. REV. 979,
1008–09 (1995) (describing the historical and then-current hypersexualization of lesbians,
gays, and bisexuals in American society).
137. See, e.g., MAJORIE GARBER, BISEXUALITY & THE EROTICISM OF EVERYDAY LIFE 54–55
(2000) (describing a former bisexual magazine’s appropriation of the stereotype that bisex-
uals will have sex with “anything that moves”); Anna Pulley, 9 Stupid Myths About Bisex-
uals that Will Make You Laugh, ALTERNET, http://www.alternet.org/print/story/149710
/9_stupid_myths_about_bisexuals_that_will_make_you_laugh (last visited Feb. 28, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/HG22-ASDT (describing popular myths about bisexuals, two
out of nine of which relate to hypersexualization: namely that bisexuals are sluts and that
they love threesomes); Claire, QA Topic: Bisexual Stereotypes, QUEERATTITUDE.COM (on
file with author) (describing several stereotypes of bisexuals involving hypersexualization);
accord Yoshino, supra note 1, at 420.
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is deserving of protection, a complaint that participants in Stonewall’s
study voiced.138 Invisibility and discrimination by religious adherents
are also reflected in both Stonewall’s research and, to some degree, in
our study.139
One of the most troubling results of our study was the infrequency
with which our respondents appear to have sought relief from discrimi-
natory action. It is difficult to find data regarding the frequency with
which other populations file complaints when subjected to discrimina-
tion. Comparing our results on this issue (9.7% of the 62 bisexual
respondents who had experienced discrimination and who answered
this question had filed an internal complaint, 3.2% had filed a com-
plaint in an agency, and no respondents had filed a lawsuit) with
responses to similar questions asked in the Roessler et al. study men-
tioned earlier, The Employment Discrimination Experiences of Adults
with Multiple Sclerosis, provides one useful point of comparison.140 In
the Roessler study, 7% of the fifty-nine respondents filed a lawsuit
and 21% filed an internal written complaint.141 Although there are
undoubtedly important distinctions between disabled and sexual mi-
nority respondents, this contrast in the frequency of seeking relief
among the respondents with multiple sclerosis and our bisexual re-
spondents is nonetheless striking.142
138. Chamberlain, supra note 23, at 3; see also BARKER ET AL., supra note 2, at 20.
139. Chamberlain, supra note 23, at 7–8; see also BARKER ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (dis-
cussing invisibility); Eliason et al., supra note 95, at 241–42 (recounting the discrimi-
nation faced by a bisexual nurse at a Catholic organization).
140. Roessler et al., supra note 112, at 24, Table 2. The only other possible source of
comparative information we found was a law review article by William Rubenstein. See
William B. Rubenstein, Do Gay Rights Matter?: An Empirical Assessment, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 65 (2001). However, this Article compares the ratios of LGB people in the population
to the percent of those filing agency complaints in certain states and concludes that those
ratios are similar to the rates at which complaints based on gender and race discrimina-
tion are filed. Id. at 67–68. In this study, self-identified bisexuals with same-gender part-
ners were included in the definition of “gays.” Id. at 85. This fact alone precludes a
meaningful comparison between our study results and those of Professor Rubenstein.
Other problems with such a comparison exist as well, such as the fact that we did not de-
rive our data from a general population sample. Additionally, Professor Rubenstein only
looked at jurisdictions where discrimination based on sexual orientation was prohibited,
whereas our respondents included persons who worked or had worked in jurisdictions
where no such laws were in place. Finally, Rubenstein’s results, unlike ours, are not lim-
ited to persons who report having experienced discrimination.
141. Roessler et al., supra note 112, at 24, Table 2.
142. One important difference between disability and sexual minority status is that,
under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213
(2014), discrimination against those with disabilities is prohibited in all fifty states,
whereas the framework of protections for sexual minorities is spotty, within only twenty-
one states providing comprehensive protections. See supra notes 46–48 and associated
text. However, it does appear that most of our respondents were protected from discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation by state or local law or by their employer’s non-dis-
crimination policy. See supra notes 129 and 130 and associated text. Additionally, the
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The high degree of discrimination experienced by bisexuals and
others with fluid identities combined with the low rates at which such
respondents sought relief is cause for concern, particularly given that
one of the primary reasons for not seeking relief, believing that one
would not get the help that he or she needed, may well be reflective of
felt stigma.
III. SOLUTIONS AND NEXT STEPS
One important and obvious step that would help LGBT workers
generally is the passage of a federal law barring employment dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation. While the repeatedly proposed
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA)143 has been legiti-
mately criticized for its shortcomings in comparison to Title VII, and
particularly for its failure to allow for disparate impact claims and its
allowance of broad religious exemptions,144 passage of ENDA would be
a step in the right direction for all LGBT workers (although amend-
ment of Title VII to include sexual orientation and gender identity
would provide stronger and more equitable protections). If either step
is taken, however, discrimination against bisexuals (and, ideally, other
fluid-identified persons) should be addressed specifically in the legis-
lative history and findings,145 preferably with some discussion of the
fact that bisexuals face both homophobia and biphobia (and are com-
monly discriminated against by both heterosexuals and gay and
lesbian persons). This would help make bisexuality more visible and
would give bisexual plaintiffs some explicit evidence of the new law’s
intent to protect them, beyond the mere inclusion of bisexuality in a
majority of our respondents’ most recent incident of discrimination occurred at a large or
mid-size employer, and such employers are probably more likely to include protections
for sexual orientation discrimination in their policies. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
143. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013).
144. Id. at § 4(g); see, e.g., Joel Rudin, Half-Way Out: Why America’s Sexual Minorities
Deserve Better Than the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 16 J. WORKPLACE RIGHTS
337, 338, 340 (2012) (addressing an earlier version of ENDA); see also Alex Reed, Abandon-
ing ENDA, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 277, 314 (2014) (discussing the shortfalls of the current
bill and arguing that evolving judicial interpretations of Title VII will ultimately better
serve LGBT persons).
145. An example of such legislative findings can be found in the Equal Opportunities
in Employment policy adopted by the City Council of Manchester:
The Council recognises that bisexual people may be the target of specific
discrimination and that their experiences often differ from those of lesbians
and gay men. The Council recognises that fear of discrimination is the major
factor which forces bisexual people to conceal their sexuality . . . .
We aim to . . . creat[e] an atmosphere and environment where it is safe for
them to do so and . . . [to] not assum[e] that employees or users of our services
are heterosexual, lesbian or gay.
U.K. Manchester, U.K. City Council, Equal Opportunities in Employment Policy State-
ment, § 3.7.3 (Jan. 19, 2011); see also Chamberlain, supra note 23, at 11 (quoting policy).
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definition section. Such a discussion in the legislative history and con-
gressional findings appears to be necessary given the Apilado Court’s
apparent misunderstanding of bisexuality, despite bisexuality’s explicit
inclusion in Washington’s public accommodations law,146 and the
judicial obfuscation of bisexuality in cases like Romer.
Beyond that, it is useful to think of solutions for the different insti-
tutions that play a role in bisexuals’ discrimination-related experi-
ences. At the highest level of the process of seeking a remedy, courts
are integrally involved. Although our respondents did not describe
any experiences with the court system related to their claims of dis-
crimination, it is evident from the analysis in Part II that some work
needs to be done in the court system to facilitate a better understand-
ing of the claims of bisexuals. At a minimum, judges writing decisions
and orders pertaining to LGBT rights should not use shorthand as
in Justice Kennedy’s majority decision in Romer to elide the existence
of bisexuals when their rights are at issue in a case.147 Such a practice
increases the invisibility and marginalization of bisexuals and the
related perception that bisexuals are not affected by discrimination.
Additionally, based on the order in Apilado and the opinion in
Romer, it appears that judges need to be educated about bisexuality
and fluid identities generally. Lawyers representing bisexual plaintiffs
should begin to provide this education via expert witnesses. While the
plaintiffs’ attorneys in Apilado introduced expert testimony, it did not
address core issues relating to explanations of bisexuality itself and
the ways in which discrimination against bisexuals manifests.148
However, given the widespread invisibility of bisexuals and the lack
of understanding within both the gay and lesbian and heterosexual
communities, it is imperative that lawyers start providing this basic
education about bisexuality via expert witnesses.
Turning to the actions of lawyers more explicitly, and learning
from the attorneys’ strategic choices in Perry and Windsor, lawyers
146. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.040(26) (defining “sexual orientation”); § 49.60.215
(prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations).
147. Accord Chamberlain, supra note 23, at 10.
148. Declaration of Russell Robinson in Support of Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition
to Granting Partial Summary Judgment to NAGAAA on its First Amendment Defense
to Plaintiffs’ Claim of Sexual Orientation Discrimination under RCW 49.60, No. ClO-
00682 JCC, Doc. 86 (Aug. 8, 2011) (expert testimony on the disproportionate effect that
NAGAAA’s discrimination against bisexuals and its limit of two heterosexual players
per team would have on people of color); Declaration of Beth Dana Kivel in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Granting Partial Summary Judgment to NAGAAA
on its First Amendment Defense to Plaintiffs’ Claim of Sexual Orientation Discrimi-
nation under RCW 49.60, No. ClO-00682 JCC, Doc. 97 (Aug. 8, 2011) (expert testimony
on the lack of necessity of rules limiting participation of heterosexuals in LGBT sports
organizations).
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representing lesbian and gay clients should become more cognizant
of how their trial and briefing strategies can negatively affect bisex-
uals. Additionally, employment and civil rights lawyers should have
the courage to represent bisexuals. A large proportion of the existing
case law involving bisexual plaintiffs is comprised of pro se cases,149
suggesting that bisexuals may not be getting the legal help that they
need, a conclusion that is consistent with many respondents’ views
that they would not get the help they needed if they sought a remedy
to the discrimination they had experienced. The conclusion that bisex-
uals need better legal representation (or to start with, legal represen-
tation period) is also supported by the fact that the bisexual plaintiffs
in several of the electronically available discrimination cases at-
tempted to sue under Title VII, which has repeatedly been held not
to cover sexual orientation.150
In terms of employers and attorneys representing them on em-
ployment matters, it is important to explicitly include bisexuality in
diversity initiatives related to sexual orientation. The usefulness of
this is demonstrated by Köllen’s research showing that explicit in-
clusion of bisexuality in such measures significantly improves bisexu-
als’ perceptions of the working climate,151 which is likely to have the
added benefit for employers of making bisexual workers more pro-
ductive.152 More specifically, bullying and harassment policies should
provide “examples of what antibisexual comments and behavior look
like.”153 Additionally and relatedly, educating all staff about discrim-
ination against bisexuals can help reduce the widespread discrimina-
tion evident in the responses to this survey.154 Finally, the research
of Heidi Bruins Green and her colleagues suggests that employers
seeking to create a positive atmosphere for bisexuals should include
gender identity in their anti-discrimination policies, as well as sex-
ual orientation.155
149. See, e.g., Davis v. Signius Inv. Corp./Answernet, 2013 WL 1339758 (N.D. Ga.
Feb. 26, 2013); Dawkins v. Richmond Cnty. Sch., 2012 WL 1580455 (M.D.N.C. May 4,
2012); Blaylock v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 2009 WL 2606245 at *1 (D.N.J. 2009); Parrella
v. Lawrence & Mem’l Hosp., 2009 WL 1279290 (D. Conn. 2009).
150. See, e.g., Davis, 2013 WL 1339758; Dawkins, 2012 WL 1580455; Blaylock, 2009 WL
2606245; Parrella, 2009 WL 1279290; see also LINDERMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 120,
at 551–52; Todd Brower, Social Cognition ‘At Work:’ Schema Theory and Lesbian and Gay
Identity in Title VII, 18 L. & SEXUALITY 1, 16–18 (2009).
151. Köllen, supra note 109, at 131; see also Chamberlain, supra note 23, at 15.
152. See & Hunt, supra note 30, at 293.
153. Id. at 297.
154. Chamberlain, supra note 23, at 15.
155. Bruins Green et al., supra note 39, at 311. Bisexuals’ greater confidence in anti-
discrimination policies that include gender identity may be the result of bisexuals’ feeling
solidarity with transgender people. Such solidarity seems likely given that the bisexuals
and other fluid-identified respondents in Bruins Green’s study identified transgender
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CONCLUSION
Our survey demonstrates that widespread discrimination exists
against bisexuals and other fluid-identified persons, and the case law
relating to the rights of bisexuals shows that there are deficiencies in
our court system that need to be remedied. Problems at bisexuals’
places of employment that are described in the social science literature
have been corroborated by our survey. Much more research needs to
be done on all aspects of bisexuals’ experiences with employment dis-
crimination. One very fruitful area of future research would be in-
terviewing bisexuals who have taken at least initial steps to pursue
legal claims of employment discrimination as to their experiences and
the barriers they faced. Another would be examination of state admin-
istrative complaints alleging discrimination against LGBT persons
filed in a specific jurisdiction to determine the proportion of bisexuals
who file such complaints compared to the proportion of lesbian and
gay persons who do so, as well as to analyze the content of complaints
by bisexuals.
Given the harmful effects of discrimination on the health of bi-
sexuals and other sexual minorities,156 our study should serve as a
call to action for the justice system and employers to move beyond bi-
erasure and to affirmatively recognize the right of bisexuals to fair
and equal treatment.
persons as the most welcoming group. Id. at 310. Additionally, it may also be because,
based on the merely nominal protection of bisexuals under many such policies, bisexuals
and other fluid-identified persons see inclusion of gender identity as an indication that
a given policy is robust and expansive.
156. See supra note 45 and sources cited therein.

